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**The Failure of the "Higher Criticism"  
of the Bible**



The  
Failure of the "Higher Criticism"  
of the Bible

BY  
✓  
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Etc., Etc.



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## PREFACE.

OF the five chapters of the present work, the first two chapters appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for February and April, 1905. The other three chapters form the substance of various lectures given by the author in London, at Edinburgh, and elsewhere. All the five chapters are results of an historic examination of the claims of "Higher Criticism," commenced many years ago. The author is not a clergyman, and has no intention whatever to become one. He means to serve the ends of no ecclesiastic party. He searches for nothing but Truth. Many years ago he fully believed in the "scientific character" of Higher Criticism; but having learned more about Life and Reality by means of extensive travels and varied experience, he has come to the conclusion that Higher Criticism is bankrupt as a method of research, and pernicious as a teaching of re-

ligious truth. It is a perversion of History, and a desecration of Religion. May this little book help unprejudiced minds to gain a truer and more reverential conception of the Holy Book of Mankind. It is intended not only to destroy the "scientific" spell of "Higher Criticism," but also to construct the right method of comprehending the Bible.

EMIL REICH.

LONDON, *August 6, 1905.*

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CHAPTER I.

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE MASAI LEGENDS.



## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### THE ARGUMENT FROM THE MASAI LEGENDS.

DESPITE all the great debt which we owe to the Renaissance, we must admit that it has foisted one great incubus upon us, and that is, the blind admiration of words. The Renaissance was undoubtedly due in very great measure to the humanists, and it was their superior knowledge of Greek and Latin which at all events aided in bringing about the vast change which at that time came over the whole mental life of Europe. What the Renaissance would have been without Greek, I do not intend here to debate. It would probably have been irreparably crippled, and Europe would perhaps never have succeeded in its present career had it not been able to walk in the footsteps of Greece. All that I would here say is that the reverence which has been paid to the mere externals of humanism has been greatly exaggerated. The words, which were the mere in-

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struments through which the new inspiration was conveyed, have been worshiped as much as, if not more than, the inspiration itself. The dicta of the philologist, without any further qualification, have been accepted with even greater admiration and adulation than have the great words of the great pioneers of human thought.

Who in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the great receivers of rewards? Not Copernicus, not the incomparable Kepler, not Descartes, not Giordano Bruno, not Spinoza, persecuted by every synod of the Seven Provinces, denied by father, mother, sister, and dying as an outcast pariah, when still in the heyday of manhood. But Scaliger, who, admirable as may be his philological ἀκρίβεια, can not claim to have advanced humanity, was invited to the newly-founded University of Leyden; he was appointed professor at a handsome salary; no obligation was required of him in return; he was not to lecture unless he graciously felt so disposed; his mere presence was deemed to shed luster enough upon the great Dutch University. Compare the position of poor Pascal in France with that of Casaubon, king of commentators, adulated by Henry IV, perhaps the greatest monarch of France, who tried to



wheedle and coax him into Catholicism, who patted him literally on the cheek and metaphorically on the back; thinking, as the King did, that if Casaubon, whom the world regarded as the mirror of all wisdom, could be gained as a convert, Protestantism in France might be extinguished much more easily. And when Casaubon was weary of France, was there not a warm welcome for him in England? James I, who could never see what he had in Bacon, was too delighted to have a Casaubon and to pay him well for the interchange of philological gabble. Meanwhile James left Shakespeare without recognition, so that to-day, there being little known about the great poet, Shakespeare bids fair to be treated as a myth by latter-day historians. Why should we speak of Bentley, whose acute scholarship, expended in ingenious emendations of Horace, won him honor and renown, although to-day, as we are told by M. Salomon Reinach, out of his hundreds of emendations of Horace only half-a-dozen meet with the acceptance of scholars? Heyne, the great critic of texts, was made an oracle and listened to with awe by the whole of Europe, was envied by Goethe, who burned to become a Heyne II, whereas Lessing was left to languish in obscurity on the miserable pit-

tance of an eighteenth-century librarian. But the *Laokoon* will live forever, while the hair-splitting textual refinements of Heyne are mostly long discredited and forgotten. But in the nineteenth century the worship of the philologists became even more exaggerated. If they did not find themselves placed invariably in high political positions, like Wilhelm von Humboldt, they were, at all events, allowed to assume undisputed dictatorship in everything pertaining to antiquity. Without any other recommendation save a linguistic smattering, they were permitted to lay down the law even on Roman legislation, and to impose their ideas or lack of ideas concerning ancient art, history, and religion. How many of those bold philologists has the last century seen, who have embarked in the nutshell of a word and set forth merrily to explore, like retrospective Colum-buses, the ocean of the prehistoric past! That so many of them have undergone shipwreck is no matter for excessive lamentation. For a long time the unsolved enigmas of hieroglyph and cuneiform preserved us from the nightmare of ancient Oriental philology. The discovery of that unfortunate Rosetta stone, seeing all the philological misery that it has entailed, can hardly be viewed as an unmitigated blessing to

mankind. Still more doubtful is our gratitude towards Grotefend and other ingenious contrivers who have enabled us to decipher Assyrian and Babylonian tablets. Hitherto the ravings of philologists had been comparatively harmless. They had been compelled to limit themselves to the demolition of the classics. Out of a missing digamma they were able, first, to rob Homer of his character, to pillory him as an impudent plunderer of other men's wits, and finally to prove most conclusively that, with or without character, he never existed at all. But, after all, this was a more or less innocuous amusement. It was no doubt a pity to see the figure-head of Greek and Roman history robbed of all credit, and turned into mere mythical figments of the primitive brain.

But to this we might have been reconciled. To-day, however, the philologists have pushed forward their linguistic parallels against far more serious objects. They are seeking to batter down the foundations of all that we believe and hold most in reverence. They have disturbed the minds and troubled the consciences of thousands of people who have been too simple to grasp the absolute emptiness of the philologists' methods in history. But assuredly the world lacks a sense of humor. How comes

it that it does not see the incongruity of allowing itself to be lectured upon ancient history, upon the origin of religions, and upon subjects even more sacred, by some little German philological pedant in some obscure German town? How comes it that there is so little inquiry into his qualifications? Why, because by dint of plodding insistence he has succeeded in spelling out some obscure Himiaritic inscription and in fitting it with some hypothetical meaning, should he be considered a luminous exponent of ancient history? On the same grounds we might admit any little schoolteacher of French or German as a capable historian of France or Germany. Here the absurdity strikes one at once. Why in the case of ancient history should it be less apparent? The man who is incapable of appreciating contemporary history is not likely to make any startling discovery in ancient history. Historical events at all times have been made by the human heart, by human passions, by the clash of will upon will, by personality. If we are unable to grasp the action of these elements to-day, when the process is going on under our very eyes, how shall we discover them in their obscure lurking-places in inscriptions and papyrus, where they are as often as not willfully disguised? For those

makers of history who have left records have seldom done so with the disinterested motive of informing posterity of the truth. If we are to interpret those records to any account, we must first have studied men in the living generation; we must know something of actual politics and their motives; we must have rubbed shoulders with many nations, felt their ambitions, and learned to know their men and women. Finally we may light upon some illuminating analogy which will enable us to see clearly into the dim records of the past.

There is certainly no single German professor of ancient history who can claim to have undergone such a training. But, necessary as it is to the advancement of truth, a preparation of the kind is not essential to his own advancement. Life in these dreamy university towns has little of the savor of reality. The professor is generally yet further isolated from reality. His training in ancient languages has cast his mind in a mold little suited to historical investigation. It is quite true that in linguistics the phenomena are of a slow and natural growth: doubtless, syntactical contrivances such as the ablative absolute have been produced by gradual evolution. No man has created a construction like this *de toutes pièces*. But in his-

tory it is far otherwise. We can not there apply methods of philology. Yet this is what has been done, and what characterizes almost every work on ancient history for the last seventy years.

The results have been disastrous. The philologist who in all his days has never seen a personality, can not bring himself to believe that institutions like the Spartan State are of the making of a single man. Thus Lycurgus has been dissolved into a myth. Theseus and Romulus have survived through more than five-and-twenty centuries, only to be ruthlessly murdered by a pack of philologists; and now, not satisfied with these crimes, they are moving forward to attack yet greater and more sacred personalities, those of Moses and even of Jesus Himself. We can not well be angry with the perpetrators of these deeds. They have used what means they had ready to hand. They have availed themselves of a weakness common to all mankind. They have made up for their ignorance and insufficiency by incantations of high-sounding names. Some of the latest samples of philological jugglery with which the public has been duped are too amusing to be omitted. If only read from the humorous standpoint, it is doubtful whether any book could afford a merrier half-hour than one of

the latest achievements of Professor Hugo Winckler—two volumes in which he finally dissolves into myth the small portion of Jewish history which had been mercifully left to us. Listen awhile, and you shall hear how Jewish tradition is a mere flimsy plagiarism of Babylonian myths. Among the general massacre of Biblical personalities we can only mention a few of the victims. What person has hitherto been more historical than Joseph? But to Professor Winckler he is an obvious astral myth, for in the forty-third chapter of Genesis, verse 25, does he not come at noon? And is not this clear enough proof that he is a mere personification of the sun? Besides, if we are disposed to doubt, we must recollect that Joseph dreamed that the sun, moon, and eleven stars bowed down to him; and whom should they bow to save the sun? Joshua, too, is the sun. For he is the son of Nûn, and does not Nûn, being interpreted, mean fish? and does not the sun at the spring equinox issue from the constellation of *Pisces*? What could be more conclusive? Besides, does it not amply explain why Joshua's companion is Caleb? Now, Caleb is Kaleb, and Kaleb is Kelb, and Kelb is a dog. So, of course, Caleb is clearly put for the dog-star Sirius.

This is indeed philology run mad. But so seriously is it taken in scientific circles that Jensen, another Assyriologist of highest repute, thought it necessary to raise his mighty voice in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, and to thunder confutation against the Wincklerian utterances. But in the midst of his thunder Jensen suddenly realizes the hideous crime he is about to perpetrate in demolishing Winckler. He evidently grasps that he is telling tales out of school, and with due contrition sets about giving us even more startling hypotheses. He discovers that Biblical history is a mere perversion of Chaldaean legends, just as was the *Odyssey* of Homer. He finds the story of the two Chaldaean Dioscures, Gilgamish and Ebani, running through the whole thing. Gilgamish is of course hidden under various names. He is in turn Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Simeon, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, and Saul. Then evidence is adduced in proof. Did not Gilgamish slay the heavenly bull? So did Moses destroy the golden calf. Israel was vexed in the desert by scorpions, but so was Gilgamish. As for the trek of Israel into the Promised Land, all stuff and nonsense. That is merely the land of the blessed which Gilgamish went to visit, and which Homer filched to put it in the *Odyssey*



as the island of the Phæacians. How delightfully simple it all becomes!

Yet the philological school of historians have met with astounding success. The effect they have had on the public has been enormous. They have had in their favor all the paraphernalia of erudition, eminently imposing to the naïve public. The admiration which the every-day man has for the knowledge of languages is a curious psychological problem. There is probably no talent which secures for its fortunate possessors such inordinate prestige. The more unknown the language is to the hearer, the more profound are the depths of wisdom for which the speaker secures credit. What wonder that when the learned historian is able to cram his footnotes with portentous vocables gleaned from Assyrian tablets, or copied from hieroglyphic steles, that his reader casts up his hands in ecstasy and marvels at the profundity of the man. Herein we have the secret of that wondrous success of the astral myth, which permits the would-be historian to drag into his service all the ponderous lore of Babylonian and later constellations and zodiac; which allows him to sit comfortably ensconced in his professional chair, to pull down volume after volume of long-forgotten wisdom, and to demolish national, re-

ligious, and other historians, without once coming into rough contact with the realities of life and passion. This method certainly offers the most abundant advantages. By a certain knack of erudition and with a minimum of thought it is possible for the most mediocre genius to pile up a volume upon practically any given subject. All that one wonders is, where will the process end? It is really surprising that any of the great personalities of history have been left intact. Why have the philologists not yet sought to undermine Mahomet? Surely it could not be so very difficult to prove that he, too, is but another alias of the sun? But his day will come, and the day of the historians will also come. In a thousand years, perhaps far sooner, one will arise who, by the most *gründlich* philological refining upon the name of Professor Winckler, will find that he too is a mere masquerader in the dress of the sun, that he is an astral myth, a clear plagiarism taken from some Babylonian baked-clay record.

Why has the school of Higher Criticism hitherto met with no really serious opponents? The question is after all not so very difficult to answer. The works of the Higher Critics abound in erudition, and to refute them by exposing the nullity of their evidence all along the line would

entail an amount of barren labor which serious thinkers scarcely care to undertake. The complete wrongheadedness of the whole method of Higher Criticism can not fail to be manifest to anybody who bases his judgments upon the true essence of the matter in dispute, and not upon mere externals. With this clear knowledge of the futility of the arguments of Higher Criticism, those who have been wise enough to see through its specious array of evidence remained contented with their wisdom. They have not thought it worth their while to enter upon a laborious point-to-point refutation, which, as it would never interest the general public, who are interested only in broad results, would inevitably prove ineffectual.

The fault of the Higher Critics lies in an utter misconception of the matter at issue. They imagine, because they have been able to trace similarities, or even identities, between the purely external phenomena of Judaism or of Christianity and the religious ceremonials of ancient Babylonia, that they have thereby proved that Christianity and Judaism are nothing but cribs of what the Babylonians long before possessed. Many of the Higher Critics upon the strength of such evidence have even gone so far as to deny the existence of Israelitic history

at all. Such, in fact, are the precise words used by Professor Winckler in a letter to the present writer. Many readers will remember the violent effect produced in the "seventies" of the last century by the appearance of "Supernatural Religion," three thick volumes which have done more to upset people's consciences than has anything else during the last hundred years. It embodies precisely the futile methods to which we have above referred, and its subversive force has been little impaired by such rejoinders as those of Sandys and Lightfoot.

Within the last few weeks matter has been published which should finally turn the Higher Critics out of the position in which they have been so long comfortably intrenched. If we can show a people living in a region of the world where there is no reason to suppose that they can ever have come into contact with Babylonianism or even with Judaism; if we can demonstrate that these people possess precisely the same tradition which we have read in the Old Testament and which we were glad to suppose was Jewish, until Professor Delitzsch and his followers tried to show it to have been purloined from Babylon; if we show all this, shall we not have made it clear even to the man in the street that there is something radically false

in the methods of argument used by the Higher Critics? For, by the same line of argument by which they have led us to believe that the whole fabric of Judaism is an impudent theft from Babylon, we can equally well prove that Judaism must have been stolen from an obscure tribe of East African negroes.

Such a nation are the Masai, a negro tribe in German East Africa. Our information we owe to a German officer stationed in German East Africa, whose carefully collected evidence it is impossible to doubt. Captain Merker has spent some eight years in the neighborhood of Mt. Kilimanjaro, and his leisure time has been devoted to the gathering together of most interesting ethnological data, which he has published in an elaborate monograph printed with the support of the German *Kolonialgesellschaft*.

It is good to hear of the scrupulous care with which Captain Merker has endeavored to avoid any kind of bias in getting together his records. He was early conscious of the remarkable coincidences between many of the native traditions and those which we find in Genesis. Such a discovery might have thrown a less conscientious and circumspect investigator off his guard. He might very well have used precipitate haste in following up his evidence. To begin with,

it was no easy task to win sufficiently the confidence of the natives, who seemed to be exceedingly reticent about their traditions. It was only with infinite trouble that they could be brought to talk at all upon the subject. But even when Captain Merker had sufficiently ingratiated himself with them to obtain their confidence, he studiously avoided putting any questions. He was anxious in no way to suggest or bias the answers, and he therefore waited patiently until the natives came of their own free will to him. In taking down their records, he observed the same scrupulous precautions. He purposely abstained, during these investigations, from referring to the Old Testament, or from making any comparisons which might cause him to falsify, even innocently and unconsciously, his observations. We can not therefore fail to accord the most complete credence to evidence accumulated with such scientific thoroughness and in so hyperconscientious a manner.

The legendary traditions of the Masai are not the common property of the whole tribe. It is only a few privileged families which possess their secret, and among these families the stories are handed down from father to son. Like all traditions thus preserved, there is imminent danger of their dying out.

Captain Merker, in his interesting description of Masai religion, informs us that the people possess no distinct priestcraft. They generally pray alone, but upon certain rare occasions the entire population of a kraal will meet together for devotional purposes. Even in such cases there is an almost entire absence of any description of ceremonial; but it is then that the aged depositaries of Masai legends will come forward and recite the ancient myths which they have learned from their forefathers.

The Masai are, however, exceedingly loth that their legends should be overheard by any one who is not a member of the community. Captain Merker tells us that though for more than four years he had been thoroughly cognizant of the main features of the Masai religion, it was not until the fifth year of his sojourn in the Kilimanjaro region that he became aware of the existence of this store of legendary beliefs. To get a comprehensive idea of these took him another eighteen months, and he encountered constant difficulties in the reticence of the natives.

I give a very brief summary of the Masai myths, which will, however, suffice to convince the reader of the astonishing similarity existing between them and our own Biblical tradition.

In the beginning the earth was a waste and barren wilderness in which there dwelt a dragon alone. Then God came down from heaven, fought with the dragon and vanquished it. From the dragon's blood, which was water, the barren rocky wilderness was made fertile, and the spot where the struggle between God and the dragon took place became Paradise. Thereafter God created all things—sun, moon, stars, plants, and beasts, and finally two human beings. The man was sent down from heaven and was called *Maitumbe*, and the woman *Naitergorob* sprang from the bosom of the earth. God led them into Paradise, where they lived an untroubled existence. Of all the fruits therein they might eat by God's permission; of one tree alone they might not taste: this was the *ol oilai*. Often God came down to see them, when he climbed down a ladder from heaven. But one day he was unable for a long time to find them, but finally he discovered them crouching among the bushes. On being asked the meaning of his conduct *Maitumbe* replied that they were ashamed because they had eaten of the forbidden fruit. "Naitergorob gave me of the fruit," he said, "and persuaded me to eat of it, after she had eaten of it herself." *Naitergorob* sought to excuse herself by saying, "The three-



headed serpent came to me, and said that by tasting the fruit we should become like unto thee and almighty." Then was 'Ngai (God) wroth, and banished the two first human beings from Paradise. He sent *Rilegen*, the Morning Star, to drive man out of Paradise, and to keep watch thereover.

This sample should give a fair idea of the astounding similarity to which we have referred. We can only briefly mention one or two of the more striking parallelisms. The Masai have a story of the first murder which reminds us forcibly of the Bible account of Cain and Abel. But even more remarkable is the Masai legend of the flood, sent as a chastisement for human iniquity. The Masai have their Noah, the holy man who is excepted from the general disaster, and so succeeds in carrying on the human race. His name is *Tumbainot*, and he, too, builds him an ark, wherein his six sons and two wives are saved, together with certain chosen animals. When the Masai Noah desires to find out whether the waters are subsiding, he, too, conceives the happy notion of sending forth a dove. Four rainbows are the sign which tells the Masai Noah that the wrath of God has passed away.

The whole story of the Decalogue finds its

place in Masai tradition. It might have been translated almost literally from the Bible. The circumstances of the Divine lawgiving are close akin to the Hebrew version. Upon the summit of *ol donjo geri* the thunder peals and the storm rages as the voice of God proclaims his law from a cloud. Nothing could be more like Moses upon Sinai. But hearken to the words of the Masai commandments. The first is as follows: "There is one God alone, who hath sent me unto you. Heretofore ye have called him the Forgiver (*E'majan*), or the Almighty (*E'mage-lani*), but henceforth ye shall call him *'Ngai*. Of him ye shall make no image. If ye follow his commands, it will be well with you; but if ye obey him not, famine and pestilence shall chastise you." Captain Merker gives just as striking resemblances between the Masai Decalogue and the third, fifth, seventh, ninth, and tenth commandments.

It would of course be very natural to suppose that these Masai legends were due to the half-forgotten teachings of some Christian missionary. But Captain Merker completely disposes of any possibility of Christian influence. There is, to begin with, no trace of New Testament doctrine or history. The Masai tradition stops short with the Divine lawgiving. It is, more-

over, quite certain that no foreign missionaries have at any time carried their propaganda into the Masai country.

That the Masai should at any time have come into contact with Babylonian culture is also quite out of the question. The assumption that the Masai at any period migrated into Africa from Egypt seems quite hypothetical. We may, at all events, think Captain Merker, be quite certain that the immigration did not take place subsequently to the fourth millennium B. C. Had the Masai passed through Egypt later than that date we might look to find some written record in Egypt itself. Of the traditions which the Masai possess we find no trace among Egyptian beliefs, so that there is no likelihood whatever of their having been brought thence. Even if we admit that the Masai came south, but before the fourth millennium B. C., we must recollect that at this early period the Babylonians were still plunged in Shamanistic superstitions.

A full consideration of the authentic story of Masai legends and myths, doctrine and dogma, forces us to lay down the following alternatives:

1. Either the Masai have received their legends at the hands of the Hebrews; or
2. The Masai have received them from the Babylonians; or

3. They have invented them—that is, they have been revealed to them independently; or

4. Both the Babylonians, Hebrews, and the Masai, coming, as they all did, from Arabia, had those legends in common before the Chaldeans went, from Arabia, northeastward to Babylonia; the Hebrews, northward to Palestine; and the Masai, southward to what is now German East Africa.

There is no fifth alternative. For the first alternative, the Hebrew origin of the Masai legends, there is not a shadow of evidence; nor is there any for the Babylonian origin of those legends; that is, the second alternative. The third alternative, a separate revelation to the Masai nation, is completely irrelevant, either for the orthodox, who believe in revelation only as regards the Hebrews; or for the "Higher Critics," who do not believe in revelation at all, whether to the Hebrews or to any other nation.

Remains the fourth alternative, or the common origin of the Hebrew, Babylonian, and Masai legends in the legends of Arabia.

There is little doubt that this, the fourth alternative, is the right one. Arabia, at all times the "store-chamber of nations," was never able to feed her untold thousands of hardy, beautiful, gifted people. Accordingly, they emigrated

in all directions, as they did in the times of Mahomet and at other times. Thousands of years before Christ a stock of religious and other legends had grown up amongst them about the great riddles of the world. This they carried into their new countries; and thus the Babylonians, the Hebrews, the Masai, and very probably many another now unknown tribe from Arabia, whether in Persia, Afghanistan, Beluchistan, or India, preserved, and still preserve, the legends about Creation, the Deluge, the Decalogue, etc., in their aboriginal form. It is just as possible, with purely philological arguments, to deduce the Masai legends from Hebrew stories as it is to deduce Hebrew legends from Babylonian myths. Or, to put it in a different fashion, the same philological arguments that have served to declare the Hebrew legends as mere copies of Babylonian myths, may now be employed in proving that all the Hebrew legends are of Masai origin, or *vice-versâ*. This absolute inability of the philological method of "Higher Criticism" to decide definitively which is the parent and which the child, at once condemns it. Already in the question as to where was the original seat of the "Aryans," philologists have, in the last eighty years, given solutions locating that seat from the Pamir, through

South Russia, to Sweden. Such Cook-tours are not permissible in Science. If philological arguments are sufficient to persuade one set of scholars that the original home of the Aryans was in Central Asia, while another set of philologists is firmly convinced that it was in Scandinavia, common sense will tell any one who cares to listen to it that philology is unable to settle that question at all. It is even so with the original home of the legends common to the Hebrews, Babylonians, and Masai negroes. If it should be found out that the Cossæans, Elamites, Scythians, or any other Central Asiatic tribe had legends similar to those of the Hebrews, then philologists will drop the "Babylonian" theory with contempt, and deduce all the Old Testament from Cossæan, Elamite, or Scythian origins.

This may be very erudite, it is at the same time most preposterous. The possession of certain legends does not prove much. A multitude of nations may have had legends similar to those of the Hebrews, or to those of the New Testament. What no nation other than the Hebrews ever had were Moses, David, the Prophets, Jesus. These personalities, in whom the greatest forces of history became focussed and intensified; these personalities, that really

made Hebrew history, if on the basis of national tendencies and national opportunities; these personalities are *the* distinctive feature of Hebrew history. They stand to the persons of Babylonian history, or Masai history, as does Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to the Hamlet in the dry chronicle of the Dane Saxo Grammaticus. If Lord Bacon had written a thousand lines in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, he would not have written Hamlet. What makes Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is the immortal and inexhaustible typical personality of Hamlet himself, which must necessarily be the product of one vast poetic imagination, and is by no means the arithmetical sum of this sentence or that in the piece called *Hamlet*. Even so the personality of Moses, David, the Prophets, or Jesus, is not an arithmetical sum of a number of sayings; but the integration of forces, national and hyper-national. One may prove that this saying of Jesus is Buddhistic, and the other is taken from the Zend-Avesta. What can never be deduced is the transcendental personality of Jesus. The marble slabs of the Parthenon came from the Pentelicus or other mounts; the Parthenon came from the Athenians of the fifth century B. C. Says Poet to Dives: "The land is yours; the landscape is mine."

It is evident that philological reasoning which brings us to results which are so little permanent, results which are absolutely overturned by the first chance discovery, must have something fundamentally wrong in it. This fundamental and initial vice, *quod tractu temporis convalescere nequit*, which can be cured neither by the moderation and soberness of Hommel, who, together with a few other historians, has not yet given in to the claims of the "Higher Critics," nor by a still greater refinement of philological methods,—this initial fault has vitiated, and will vitiate, all modern hypercriticism of ancient records. Nor is there any particular difficulty in finding out the true nature of this fault. It is this: The history of the ancient nations must be constructed, not on the basis of the philological study of their records, but mainly on the basis of considerations of geography, or, as the present writer has ventured to call it, of geo-politics. What made the few tribes, "Semitic" or other, in Palestine, Syria, and Phœnicia, so important a factor in history was neither their language nor their "race." The Hebrews and the Phœnicians have indeed played in history a *rôle* of the first magnitude. So have, even in a greater measure, the Hellenes. All the three were—and this is



the capital point—border-nations proper. They lived on the great line of friction between the powerful and civilized inland Empires of Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, the Hittites, the Phrygians, the Lydians, etc. All these inland Empires necessarily, and as a matter of history, gravitated towards the “Great Sea,” or the Mediterranean; all the peoples on the “line” between the Mediterranean and the territories of the conflicting Empires were then necessarily exposed to the maximum of friction, danger, and deeply agitated activity. Those nations were called the Hellenes, the Phœnicians, the Hebrews, the Edomites, etc. Being in imminent danger of absorption at the hands of the Empires, those nations could not but see, and did see, that they could protect themselves with success only by having recourse either to the immense leverage of sea-power, which the Empires did not possess; or by energizing themselves both intellectually and politically to a degree much more intense than the Empires had ever done. Accordingly some of them were forced to lay extraordinary premiums on higher intellect and spiritual growth, by means of which they resisted the more massive onslaught of the intellectually inferior Empires. What the sea was to the Hellenes and the Phœnicians,

the desert was to the Hebrews: both sets of border-nations were aided by nature in their Titanic struggle against fearful odds. What Monotheism was to the Hebrews, greater political, artistic, and philosophic achievements were to the Hellenes and the Phœnicians. The real leaven of ancient History is represented, not by the huge Empires of Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, etc.; but by the small border-nations called Hebrews, Phœnicians, and Hellenes. These small but ever-memorable people did, by higher intellect, on the western coast of Asia, what in our times the Japanese, another border-nation, have done on the eastern shores of Asia, thanks to a deliberate Europeanization of their intellect. Nearly suffocated by two huge Empires, Russia and China, and not less jeopardized by several more European great powers, the Japanese have, by conscious self-education and Europeanization, succeeded in securing, at any rate, their existence as a great power, and perhaps more. Whoever the Greeks originally may have been, whether "Celtic" or "Aryan," "Pelasgic" or "Hittite," they were unable to do anything remarkable before they arrived at an historical *locus*, where geo-political circumstances compelled them to mature indefinitely their mental and physical endowment. To

search laboriously into the problem of the "race" of the Hellenes is infinitely less important than to point out and to investigate the working of those geo-political circumstances in the second millennium B. C.

Higher Criticism stands therefore condemned from the outset. It is based on purely philological considerations in a matter that is almost exclusively founded on considerations geo-political. Several more "Masai" peoples may yet be discovered, with several more striking similarities to the myths, legends, dogmas of the Hebrews. But what can never be discovered are other cases of the peculiar geo-political circumstances of the second millennium B. C. in Western Asia. Nor can it be discovered that a series of leading Personalities, such as the border-nations in Western Asia, and they alone, then needed, were found in Central Africa, or can be dispensed with in Palestine, Phœnicia, and the Hellenic Islands. That gigantic intellectual struggles, such as those border-nations were forced to undertake or else perish, can not be conducted without Personalities of the first order, only a mere text-critic can doubt. One may deny the existence of the Jews; but once their existence is conceded one can not deny the existence of Moses. One may

deny the existence of the Carthusians; but once their existence—*i. e.*, their secular spiritual struggle with all the forces of life—is admitted, one can not possibly deny the historic existence of St. Bruno. One may minimize, or doubt the Reformation; but certainly not Luther. “Higher Criticism” has arrived at its final term: bankruptcy.

CHAPTER II.

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE BORDER-NATIONS.



## CHAPTER II.

### THE ARGUMENT FROM THE BORDER-NATIONS.

TO THE "Remonstrance" of Canon Cheyne in the March number of this *Review* I here offer my reply; although it is difficult to reply to one who excels in the art of saying and unsaying the same thing in the same breath. The learned Canon takes me to task for having declared Higher Criticism bankrupt; but does he not "assert" himself the "inadequacy" of "the prevalent methods of Higher Criticism" (p. 367)? What is "inadequacy" in cool Oxford, may that not adequately be called "bankruptcy" in lively London? The reverend Professor calls my little book ("Success," etc.) "illuminating," and that is very flattering for me. I now feel that I have done something. But then again, I am told that I am "vague and paradoxical." Paradoxical, *si Deo placet*, I may be; but not vague. I beg to assure my very learned critic that I am not vague. I may be totally mis-

taken in most things I say, but I can not be vague. Having given over thirty years of close study and observation to the topics of history before I rushed into print, I knew very well what I was saying when I wrote about the bankruptcy of Higher Criticism. Is there any vagueness in saying that Higher Criticism is bankrupt? It is the clearest thing in the world. It may be wrong, but certainly it is not vague. Remains "paradoxical." Perhaps Professor Cheyne will allow me to give him my definition of "paradoxical." It is, in too many cases, the original idea of a "free lance," which is first duly cried down by the professional scholars—*i. e.*, by such as have chairs; a few years later, however, these very chairs take up that very original idea, sometimes forgetting to mention the name of him who first uttered it. In this sense, I make bold to say, I am thoroughly paradoxical. When, fifteen years ago, I first pointed out that *Infamia* was *the* most important legal-political institution of the Romans, I was duly *mis à l'index*. Strange to say, the same silly idea was revealed as a fundamental truth to scholars here and abroad, from four to six years after I had published my Oxford lectures in 1890. I am now pilloried for sundry ideas, in the elaboration of which I have spent



a lifetime; in the misunderstanding of which my critics spend an hour; and in the copying of which they will spend many a year. Undoubtedly, I am paradoxical; nor can I afford the luxury of modesty. I have waited too long. The eve is approaching. I must make haste to say what I have to say. In the present case, too, I will hasten to the point. I might indeed make various remarks on the Canon's suggestion that I am not quite at home in the bibliography of the problems here discussed. But I am sure, if Canon Cheyne knew just a little more of me, he would have avoided—let us say—exposing himself to that extent. Or does the Canon mean to imply that of all the well-calendared and indexed “literatures” of learned subjects, I do not know the most perfect and handiest bibliography, that of theology? That I have not, a hundred times a year, handled the *Theologischer Jahresbericht*, *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, Brieger's *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, not to speak of the respective sections in Jastrow's *Jahresberichte*, nor of the leading works up to that of Jacquier in this year?

Let us drop such pedantries. I do not doubt one moment that Canon Cheyne has laid his hand on every book, thesis, or essay, bearing on the subjects of his research. The bibliographies,

past and current, of theology are far too perfect for that. I do not doubt the Canon's knowledge of books. I doubt most decidedly his and his friends' knowledge of the subject. I doubt; in fact, I assert that whatever the Higher Critics, whether Canon Cheyne, Hugo Winckler, or Professor Driver may know about the language of the Old Testament, they know most inadequately the subject-matter of the Old Testament. A word about the language. We have a witness of first-rate value to the effect that our knowledge of Hebrew is very poor. Spinoza—not only of Jewish origin, but also up to his eighteenth year a student of Hebrew lore in a Hebrew academy, where lectures in the upper classes were delivered and discussed in Hebrew—Spinoza expressly informs us that our knowledge of that ancient language is very poor. Accordingly no Winckler in the world can advance that for linguistic and stylistic researches into the Old Testament he or any one else can make good the first and chief condition of success: a thorough knowledge of the idiom. Spinoza says (*Tractatus theologico-politicus*, cap. vii, in *Opera*, ed. Van Vloten and Land, II, p. 45):

“ . . . Hebræa autem natio omnia ornamenta omneque decus perdidit . . . *nec nisi pauca quædam fragmenta lingue et pau-*

*corum librorum retinuit; omnia enim fere nomina fructuum, avium, piscium, et permulta alia, temporum injuria, periere. Significatio deinde multorum nominum et verborum, quae in Bibliis occurrunt, vel prorsus ignoratur, vel de eadem disputatur. . . . Non itaque semper poterimus, ut desideramus, omnes uniuscuiusque orationis sensus, quos ipsa ex linguae usu admittere potest, investigare; et multae occurrunt orationes, quamvis notissimis vocibus expressae, quarum tamen sensus obscurissimus erit et plane imperceptibilis.”* This much as to the Hebrew language, and our knowledge thereof.

If we now turn to the subject matter of Old Testament history we see at once that there are four points requiring the utmost care and fullness of research. The four points are: (1) The Hebrew Nation; (2) the Hebrew State; (3) the great Hebrew Personalities; and (4) the Hebrew Sacred Book, the Bible. Unless we arrive at a clear and well-differentiated conception of these four main pillars of Hebrew history, we can not possibly hope to raise any permanent edifice of knowledge with regard to Hebrew antiquity. The principal charge I advanced, and do advance, against the so-called Higher Critics is this, that as to the first three points they have not studied the problem at all;

and as to the fourth point (the Bible), that they have indeed studied it, but in a hopelessly wrong manner. With regard to the first three points, all that I have to say is my own; with regard to the fourth point, my evidence is chiefly drawn from Klostermann's incomparably strong argumentation in his "*Der Pentateuch.*" This is also one of those "paradoxical," if exceedingly learned, books which "the profession" has first cried down, and then apparently silenced by not talking about it; but which, in the end, will be the generally accepted truth. It is a decisive book, and I will endeavor to bring its main points, by means of an illustration from modern literary history, within the grasp of any unprejudiced person of sense.

I. First, then, as to the Hebrew Nation. The orthodox view, as every one knows, is to the effect that the Hebrews were an exceptional nation. This view, if expressed in theological language, runs thus: the Hebrews were God's own elect people. As in most other things, so in this case, the orthodox view is quite right in substance, if not quite "correct" in form. The Hebrews *were* an exceptional nation. They were a border-nation; that is, they were, from about 1500 to 700 B. C., so placed in historical space that while they were constantly threatened

with imminent absorption at the hands of the huge inland Empires around them, they yet were enabled to baffle the designs on their political existence with success. There have frequently been such nations in the course of history. They unite two peculiar features in their political and intellectual economy. They are (1) on the borders of one powerful Empire, or of several Empires; (2) they have, in spite of their exiguity, some leverage as a gift of nature or history equalizing the chances between them and their powerful assailants. These two features must be combined, otherwise the small nations on the borders of powerful Empires must inevitably fall under the yoke of the latter. Such a nation was the people of Phœnicia, whose famous city-states of Aradus, Tyre, Beyrut, etc., were never, or never permanently, conquered by the Assyrians, Hittites, Babylonians, or Egyptians.<sup>1</sup> The simple reason of the successful re-

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<sup>1</sup>The first Egyptian campaign in Syria was under Tahutimes (Thutmasis) III, (F. Petrie, *History of Egypt* (1899) II, pp. 103 *sq.*); other campaigns were conducted by Amenhotep II; by Harmais (about the middle of the fourteenth century B. C.: see *Recueil de Travaux rel. à . . . Varchéol. égypt.* xvii, pp. 42 *sq.*); by Sety I; by Ramses II; by Menephtah; by Ramses III (about twelfth century B. C.). Of Assyrian Kings, Tiglathpileser I (about 1100 B. C.); Ashurirbi (eleventh century B. C.); see the reports of

sistance of nearly all the Phœnician city-states on the borders of the great inland Empires was their command of sea power, which the Empires did not understand how to acquire. For this reason, and owing to the readier intellect of the Phœnicians, the Empires of the Hittites, Assyrians, Babylonians, and Egyptians were never able to possess themselves definitely of the Phœnician coast.<sup>2</sup> The readier intellect of the Phœnicians was a natural consequence of circumstances, owing to which border-nations, living, as they do, constantly on the *qui vive*, must inevitably lay a great premium on ready intellect as the sole remedy in moments of great danger. The more frequent the danger, the keener the intellect averting or combating it. The people of Aradus, Tyre, Byblos, Sidon,

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Salmanassar II, in H. Winckler, *Keilschrift. u. d. alte Test.* (1902), p. 38; Ashurnasûbal in 876 B. C.; Salmanassar II, in 856 B. C.; Tiglathpileser III, in 742 and 738 B. C.; Sanherib, in 704; etc. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne* III (1899), pp. 41, 279, 280, 281, 288, 352. The inscription in Schrader's *Keilinschr. Bibl.* I, 125, 127, is wrongly interpreted by Winckler as proving the conquest of Aradus by Tiglathpileser I.

<sup>2</sup>Even Byblos declared, about 1075 B. C., to an Egyptian envoy asking for permission to cut timber in the Lebanon, that neither Zeker-baal, its then king, nor his ancestors had ever been under Egyptian rule. See in Golenischeff, *Recueil de Travaux* (1899), the diary of the Egyptian envoy's journey.

etc., were like sentinels, eagerly listening to every rumor or sign from the lands of the Hittites, Assyrians, Babylonians, or Egyptians, let alone the Ægæan islands. Thus they could not help becoming people of singularly keen intellect. For, however frequently the inland Empires were baffled in their attempt at securing the coast of Syria and Phœnicia, they could never relax in their designs on this, the indispensable outlet to their inland possessions. The Phœnicians, then, were a border-nation *par excellence*, and an exceptional nation. I mention them because it so happens that we know very much more about their history in the second half of the second millennium B. C. than about the other numerous tribes and nations on the great line of friction between the various Empires; *i. e.*, in Syria and Palestine. Before speaking of these other border-nations, and more particularly of the Hebrews, it is, I take it, most important to discuss, if ever so briefly, the way in which Hugo Winckler treats of the Phœnicians. For, not only is Canon Cheyne much inclined to speak of Winckler's historical views with great satisfaction, but Winckler is also held by the Canon (p. 367) to have advanced geo-political views on this matter. *Quod non.* Winckler knows nothing of border-nations,

and their immense importance in history is quite unknown to him. He does not call the Phœnicians or Hebrews a border-nation. I call them so; it is another "paradoxical" idea of mine. And I venture to add (this time, with Professor Cheyne's approbation) that this is an explanation helping us materially in the historical construction of Syrian, Phœnician, and Palestinian events in the second half of the second millennium B. C. I cordially thank Professor Cheyne for having declared this geopolitical term and view of mine to be "excellent" (p. 367). But Winckler is quite innocent of it. Nay, Winckler, on the basis of the Tel-el-Amarna letters, declares that the Phœnician towns of that period (1500 to 1000 B. C.) "give him a most desolate impression of wretchedness, of excessive pettiness and insignificance."<sup>3</sup> The ruler of Gebal (Byblos), Winckler says, appears in the Amarna letters as one "whining" and moaning for help from Egypt. This can not be denied. Rib-Addi of Byblos does indeed clamor for help from Egypt. But apart from the fact that other Phœnician towns (Sidon and Arvad [Aradus]) of the same period, far from "whining" for help, boldly

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<sup>3</sup>Hugo Winckler, *Altorient. Forschungen* I, pp. 426, 429.



attack Egyptian subjects and Egyptian supremacy;<sup>4</sup> the “whining” letters of Byblos, Tyre, and Jerusalem do not in the least prove the helplessness or puny pettiness of those border city-states. It was part of their deep game to appear helpless while intriguing against the very power whose help they implored. While Zimrida of Sidon complains to the Pharaoh about raids on the part of the Habiri (probably the Hebrews), Abimilki of Tyre complains about raids on the part of that very Zimrida of Sidon.<sup>5</sup> The Phœnician border-states acted as materially small powers exposed to the inroads of mighty, or apparently mighty, empires have always acted. The Italian city-states in the Middle Ages, including papal Rome, invariably “whined” for help from the German or Greek Emperor, although they just as invariably

<sup>4</sup> *Tel-el-Amarna Letters*, ed. H. Winckler (1896), pp. 175 (letter 81), 199 (letter 92), 235 (letter 124), 275 (letter 150), 283 (letter 155). Winckler indeed says (*Keilinschr. u. d. alte Test.* (1902), p. 199, that “Aziru, ‘amel’ (ruler) of the inland Amurri, ‘possessed’ Arvad,” and quotes the 150th letter of the Amarna collection, section 59. The passage in question in Winckler’s own edition runs, however, “*Zimrida of Sidon and Aziru rebel against the king, and the people of Arvad have conferred with another.*” This certainly does not prove that Aziru possessed Arvad.

<sup>5</sup> *Amarna Letters*, letters Nos. 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155.

turned against those emperors a few months or years after they had implored Imperial assistance, if circumstances had changed. Pope John XII asked Otto the Great in 960 A. D. "for the love of God" to come into Italy and to save the Church of St. Peter.<sup>6</sup> Shortly afterwards Pope John became the most violent adversary of Otto. The Italian town of Beneventum asked Emperor Lothar III, "with tears," to help it against Roger Count of Sicily, in 1133.<sup>7</sup> Four years later the good citizens of Beneventum turned a deaf ear to all the offers and proposals of the same Lothar.<sup>8</sup> This was evidently also the *politique de bascule* of the Phœnician city-states. When Egypt attacked them, they became the allies of the Hittites or of the Babylonians, or *vice versâ*. When they were beaten on land, they withdrew to their impregnable island-towns. The alliances and counter-alliances between the border-nations themselves were countless. All the resources of the sub-

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<sup>6</sup> "Misit nobis in Saxoniam nuntios, rogans ut ob amorem Dei in Italiam veniremus et ecclesiam Sancti Petri ac se ipsum ex eorum faucibus liberaremus" (Liúþrandus, *Hist. Otton*, c. 15).

<sup>7</sup> "Lacrymis orantes, ut civitatem Beneventanam a comite Rogerio Siculorum jugiter oppressam liberarent," Falco, *Chron.*, p. 113 (ap. Muratori, *Ser. Rer. Ital.*, vol. v.)

<sup>8</sup> Falco, *ib.* p. 121.

tlest diplomacy must have come into play; just as of all European States in modern times small Savoy always practiced the most refined and far-seeing diplomacy.<sup>9</sup>

To put it briefly: the border-nations in Syria, Phœnicia, and Palestine, in the second half of the second millennium B. C., were the most important of all the nations then known to Western Asia. It is they who, under stress of secular and Titanic struggles against immense odds, were forced into developing the one force that will give even small nations a decisive superiority over ever so large Empires less endowed with gifts of that force. That force is intellect, and intellectual organization of resources material or spiritual. The inland Empires had, long before the rise of the border-nations proper, developed, in a slovenly and unsystematic fashion, certain resources of the human intellect. But they never crystallized observations into principles; dwellers into citizens; houses or monuments into Art proper; speech into Literature; religious emotions into Religion. These

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<sup>9</sup>In the recent excavations and finds at Tel Ta'annek (under Dr. Ernst Sellin) we have secured additional glimpses of the agitated life of some of the border-nations in Syria. See *Denkschriften* of the Vienna *Akademie, Philos. Hist. Classe*, No. IV, ex. 1904, in fol. pp. 123. *ill.*

great feats were reserved for the border-nations, and for them alone; for the Hebrews, Phœnicians, Hellenes, and, no doubt, many another now forgotten people, who, under secular stress, making Intellect and System a *sine quâ non* of their existence, were driven into a most penetrating attempt at organizing their lives in one, two, or more directions. Had geography not aided them by geo-political advantages of situation, they would at once have been swallowed up by the Empires. Had they not developed Intellect, their geo-political situation could not have availed them very long.

In other words, all these border-nations were *per eminentiam* exceptional nations. It is not in Babylon, or Pan-Babylonianism, nor in Egypt, that we must look for the true beginnings of real civilization. It is amongst the border-nations that the great principles of State, Art, Literature, and Religion were organized and given undying vitality.

If, now, we ask the "Higher Critics" what historic rank they allot to Phœnicians, Edomites, Canaanites, Hebrews, Midianites, etc., the answer is one of cold contempt. In their view, these "Semitic" tribes were all second-hand merchandise; poor reflexes of Babylonian or Egyptian, perhaps Hittite "culture." The

very disruption of early history into history Semitic, and history Hellenic, clearly shows a total want of historic insight. All these nations form, historically, one single group, the group of border-nations in and around Western Asia. They have the same character; the same tendencies; although in appearance they differ very considerably. They are like graphite, coal, and diamond, which differ outwardly and even inwardly to a large extent, but which yet are, chemically, one and the same substance, carbon.

We may now return to the Hebrews. From the preceding considerations it is at once evident that the Hebrews, too, from their very situation in historic space, could not but be an exceptional nation, or not be at all. They might very well have been swallowed up by the neighboring Empires, or annihilated in incessant warfare with the other numerous border-nations. But if they contrived to survive, they could not but become an exceptional, *i. e.*, a border-nation.


All this is irrefutable, and quite independent of Scriptural or theological evidence. It can be read off from the map. It is only by the effect of purely philological considerations that the "Semitic" nations, when they are small in numbers, are made to appear as insignificant

phenomena in history. The sober fact is, that *all* the numerous peoples living between the deserts of North Arabia and Western Babylonia, on the one hand, and the Eastern Mediterranean, on the other, were put, certainly after 1500 B. C., and probably long before that date, under such political and military pressure as to compel them, in sheer self-defense to have recourse to an intensification of their intellectual, mental, and moral resources such as the inhabitants of the surrounding Empires neither needed nor were enabled to realize. Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους,—“Strife is the Father of all things, the King of all; it makes of some gods, of others men; of some it makes slaves, of others again freemen.” Heraclitus, of Ephesus, who uttered this, the deepest of all historical truths, was himself the citizen of one of those border-states which in secular struggles against Hittites, Phrygians, Lydians, and other Imperial peoples had long learned to know the real quickening forces of its greatness.

A glance at the sketch-map here placed will suffice to show the thoughtful reader that all the small nations in Syria, Phœnicia, and Pal-

estine, whatever their language may or may not have been (which is of quite secondary importance), were, as the symbolic arrows show it on the map, under the constant and immense stimulus of the most imperiled, yet not impossible position of border-nations, because the various inland Empires all closed round them. What the sea was to the Phœnicians, the desert was to many a border-nation dwelling more inland. It offered them a safe place of refuge.

I can not but say that the following sketch-may, although all its lines expressing boundaries or movements are only symbolically true (*i. e.*, true for various periods, not for one simultaneous period), is the first, the fundamental consideration in any study of Hebrew antiquities, including Bible criticism. What then shall be said about men like Wellhausen, who, owing to purely philological hypercriticisms, has acquired an appalling authority, and who, in his *Israelitisch und Jüdische Geschichte*, actually contrives to write the history of the Hebrews *in the second millennium B. C.* without so much as mentioning the influence of the Empires, or the character of the Hebrews as a border-nation? So little is Wellhausen aware of the true bearings of Hebrew history, that when (p. 35, of the third edition) he





finally, at the very end of a long chapter, stoops to ask the principal question of all Hebrew history, viz., why the Hebrews, and not, *e. g.*, the Moabites, came subsequently to be a nation of vast historic importance, he shakes off the inconvenient query with the well-known professional phrase: “(das) lässt sich *schliesslich* nicht erklären!” This untranslatable phrase means, that since Wellhausen can not see his way to solve the riddle, no one else possibly can or should try to do so. This “*lässt sich schliesslich nicht erklären,*” this “*sehnodderig*” *schliesslich*, is, I beg to submit, the openly avowed bankruptey of all Higher Criticism as a means of historical reconstruction of past events.

How incomparably more “*wissenschaftlich*” and critical is the simple old tradition! Let us study it exclusively in the light of history and geography and common-sense psychology. Let us drop Theology and Religion altogether.

We saw that the Hebrews were a border-nation; we saw that for this reason alone they were, like the Dutch, Scotch, or Boers in modern times, an exceptional nation. We likewise saw that they shared this quality with numerous other nations on the great Area of Friction, such as the Phœnicians, Moabites, Edomites,

etc. When, then, we learn (as all agree) that the Hebrews had certainly as early as the ninth century B. C. a belief and religious system of Monotheism which for the last three thousand years has proved its immense force over men and destiny, being, as it is, the great religious fortress of over five hundred millions of the most civilized and powerful peoples, we can not but admit that the singular influence of the Hebrews must have been owing to their Monotheism. This alone, it is true, would not yet form a great advance in historical knowledge. But if we now approach the question why the Hebrews, and they alone, should have come to elaborate, certainly by the tenth, and most probably long before the tenth century B. C., a system of belief endowed with an unique spiritualizing and energizing force; then we can, in common psychology, assume only one thing: Since the chief *historical* (as distinct from theological) value of *Hebrew* Monotheism (as distinct from any other vague Monotheism of some Egyptians or Babylonians) consists mainly and principally in its affording its believers a staying force and ever-resisting tenacity of unparalleled intensity, the Hebrews must at some time before the tenth century B. C., have stood in urgent need of such an unparalleled staying

force, to aid them in passing through national crises of unparalleled severity. This much is absolutely certain.

If now it be, as it undoubtedly is, the most legitimate conclusion, that Monotheism in its Hebrew form presupposes some unparalleled national peril, for the averting of which Hebrew Monotheism has been introduced repeatedly in history; then we need only inquire among the various nations in the Area of Friction whether their chronicles or legends tell of any such extraordinary national peril that befell them some time in the latter half of the second half of the second millennium B. C.

It is well known that the only border-nation of which we have a distinct tradition to the effect that their ancestors had gone through a fearful trial and struggle for liberation, are the Hebrews. The Hebrews alone tell of their abject slavery in Egypt; of their Exodus; of their fearful trials in the desert during forty years. How, under these circumstances, can we take the liberty, or the arrogance, I should like to say, to doubt this tradition? Is it not in perfect harmony with the undoubted fact called Monotheism, revealed in authentic writings from the eighth century B. C., and with the infallible psychological inference from this

fact? One might, in the extreme case—I mean on the strength of texts to be discovered in the future—advance, that the slavery in Egypt, the Exodus, the forty years in the desert, as related in the Bible, are not historical facts. Yet, even in this extreme case, which is still absolutely hypothetical, I should retort: “I accept the newly-discovered (hypothetical) Egyptian or Midianitic evidence to the effect that the Exodus, etc., did not take place at all. Yet I still must insist on some such event in the history of the Hebrews in the latter half of the second millennium B. C. If the adversaries can not deny some such event, then they have done nothing towards weakening either my chief fact (Amos, Hosea) or my psychological inference from that fact.”

Is there such hypothetical evidence? Can the slavery in Egypt, the Exodus, the forty years in the desert, be shown to *contradict* express and direct historical evidence from the latter half of the second millennium B. C.?

There is none whatever. How, then, can any one feel entitled to doubt Hebrew tradition? On what ground will he do that? Will he deny the authenticity of Amos and Hosea? Or will he contest the correctness of the psychological inference from Amos and Hosea? In either case

he undertakes a hopeless task. As the Boers could never have been energized into a nation of the most extraordinary power of resistance without their previous terrible trek or exodus for twenty years in the wildest parts of Africa, so the Hebrews could never have embraced and spread the most energetic of religious beliefs without some immense national trial. Tradition says this trial was Egypt, the Exodus, the Desert. We have no historical evidence contradicting this. Whence, then, shall we take the right to doubt it?

It is thus quite evident that Higher Criticism has entirely neglected or, at best, misconstrued the first of the four factors of Hebrew antiquity, the Hebrew nation. It has seen neither its exceptional character nor the causes thereof; neither the dominant fact, nor its psychological inferences and antecedents. We shall now examine much more briefly the second factor, the Hebrew State.

II. As the Hebrew Nation, so the Hebrew State has been neglected by the Higher Critics. For them a State is a State, just as the word "Godhead" is philologically only a substantive, like "cat." However, there is vast difference between State and State. Not only are some States monarchical, others oligarchical, others

again democratic. This refers only to the mere form of States. But as to origin and physiology, some States are like organic pyramids growing from the broad basis of popular wishes and forces upwards, tapering to a head, like most Continental States; other States again are cephalic pyramids, growing from the top downwards to the broad base. The State of Geneva, under Calvin in the sixteenth century was cephalic; so is each great Order of the Catholic Church; so is the Roman (not the Greek or Anglican) Catholic Church; so were Sparta, Rome, Syracuse, and many another classical State. So was the Hebrew State. He who does not see that sees nothing. Border-nations, ever imperiled, ever constrained to organize themselves into the most efficient form of polity, must inevitably put their organization into the hands of a few men, and, in very urgent cases, into those of One Great Personality. By doing so they secure Unity, Readiness, Efficiency. The Hebrew State showed at all times (from about 1250 to 700 B. C.) the unmistakable symptoms of a State actuated and energized by a central, personal, and all-pervading Force, whether a nomothetes, a Judge, a King, or a Prophet. As in the sphere of religion the Hebrews ever tended to Monotheism; so in the

sphere of State-life they ever tended to concentration in One Personality. They were indeed a cephalic State proper.

Have the Higher Critics so much as approached this vital point? Can any book or essay be pointed out in which they have *ex professo*, treated of the peculiar, *i. e.*, the cephalic nature of the Hebrew State?

There can thus be no doubt that Higher Criticism, *quod dicitur*, has proved itself unable to treat adequately of the second great factor of Hebrew antiquity, of the Hebrew State.

III. We now come to the third factor, to Hebrew Personalities; that is, to Moses, to the Judges, Kings, and Prophets.

Canon Cheyne says (p. 363): "I am myself one of those who hold the historical existence of a personage called Moses to be unproved and improbable." Nothing could be more correct. A "personage" Moses can indeed not be proved directly, and apart from the Bible, to have existed. But a Personality called Moses can. A "personage" is any person, a cobbler, a copyist, a philologist. A Personality, on the other hand, is not *le premier venu*. It is a person endowed with as yet unanalyzable forces of persuasion and action. It is a person like Themistocles, Pericles, Cæsar, Jeanne d'Arc, Calvin, Crom-

well, Chatham, Napoleon. This is said, not because (as the Canon suggests), "some historians dwell more on personalities, and some more on intellectual currents and tendencies" (p. 363). The true student of history will for each problem severally decide, or try to decide, whether "currents" were its real causes or "Personalities." In the case of the Hebrews, as we have seen, Personalities are the *sine quâ non* of their success. That an Exodus can not be carried out without a guiding and towering Personality, only a recluse philologist can doubt. That Monotheism requires, to the present day, individual persuasion by single missionaries, instead of spreading, as do other religions, by contagion, is a matter of fact too obvious to need proofs. Once we admit the Exodus—and we can not, up to this writing, but admit it as a perfectly safe assumption of fact—we are constrained, by elementary psychology, to admit a Personality organizing the Exodus and its sequel. That Personality, the Bible says, was called Moses. It is quite possible that his name was Sesom, or Urial, or Smith; and I, for one, shall at once change his name, as soon as contemporary or otherwise conclusive evidence shall be put before me that his name was not Moses, but Smith. But I can never admit that



there never was a Personality called Moses or Smith. The name is accidental; his *rôle* is psychologically undoubted and irrefutable.

Of course, when "Higher Critics" (as does Canon Cheyne, p. 363), require us to prove the existence of Abraham as well, and in the same way as that of Moses, then we can only regretfully decline the task. Abraham is not a Personality. There is no safe psychological inference from the work he did to his personal existence. He is a person; an interesting person; a patriarch; an eminent man. His existence has to be proved by means essentially different from those applicable in the case of Moses. I can safely infer the existence of Lycurgus in the ninth century B. C. from the Spartan constitution in the fifth century B. C.; but I can not do the same thing with regard to Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, in the fifth century B. C., from the history of Cleomenes III in the third century B. C. An eminent Person is still very far from a Personality; an *ἀνὴρ δόκιμος* ("a prominent man") from a *νομοθέτης*. Abraham may very well have existed; there is nothing that has so far been advanced that, in my view, militates against his existence. But we can not with regard to him rely, outside direct evidence, upon evidence

purely psychological. He is not an historical Personality. The Higher Critics, treating persons like vocables, amongst which there is indeed no difference of rank and efficiency, do not see that. That is precisely why they have failed to do justice to the third great factor of Hebrew antiquity, to Hebrew Personality.

IV. We now come to the fourth factor of Hebrew antiquity, the Bible. We beg to repeat: the "Higher Critics" have never made a serious or systematic study of the first three points or factors discussed in the preceding part of this article. Of this, the fourth factor, they have indeed made a most elaborate study, "analyzing" every single line and word of the Old and New Testaments in thousands of books, theses, essays, and articles. Yet nothing can be more evident than that their whole method is radically wrong; as wrong as was that of the thousands of Wolfian *Homer-Kritiker*, who tried, in innumerable works, to refine grand old Homer into Homer Ltd. At present, as witness the elaborate works of V. Terret, Drerup, Bréard, and so many others, Homer Ltd. is bankrupt, and Homer is still Homer. Shall I remind the gentle reader of the flood of German theses started by Nissen's *Einquellentheorie*? How countless Roman and Greek writers were

subjected to the very "analysis" of their respective "Quellen," or sources, that has been applied to the Bible, and with the same result of hopeless barrenness and failure? All scholars know the farce of that uncouth erudition and *Silbenstecherei*.

The Pentateuch (or Hexateuch, if you please) has been, as is but too well known, "analyzed" into countless layers or fragments (read: shreds) raked together by some one or two or x "redactors" from the writings of a supposed chronicler in Jerusalem, 1400 or 1200 B. C., called Jahwist<sup>1</sup>; and similarly from the monographs, theses, academic *Probeschriften* or political *ὑπομνηματα* of a Jahwist<sup>2</sup>, Jahwist<sup>3</sup> . . . <sup>4</sup> . . . <sup>5</sup>; and likewise, from the private diaries, news-cuttings, and correspondence of Elohist<sup>1</sup>, Elohist<sup>2</sup>, Elohist<sup>3</sup>; and also from various codices of priests in various centuries. The way the various "redactors" welded all this heterogeneous material into an apparently uniform work was exceedingly cunning. They covered up the traces of their compiling and cobbling activity in the most *raffiné* manner; and very frequently they used the subtlest game of *ricochet* to send their critics off the right track. But, do you not see, O student, that although the "redactors," and especially

that arch-editor, Ezra, were people of the most Machiavellian cunning and *finesse*, yet the "Higher Critics" are quite up to their tricks. They, the "Higher Critics," can not be duped; O, no. They see through the holes and chinks of their own theories, as well as of those of the "redactors," with unflinching certainty. They ferret out the least little rabbit of literary duplicity. There is nothing they do not see.

The average gentleman has neither the time nor the patience to follow De Wette, Bleek, Wellhausen, Driver, or Canon Cheyne in their purely philological hypercriticism of the text of the Bible. There is, however, fortunately for our present purpose, a most illuminating illustration of their methods in a vast book, referring to a modern author whose works, written in the eighteenth century, are subjected to the very hypercritical analysis of texts that has so "triumphantly" been applied to the Bible.

The author is Lessing; born 1729, died 1781. All the world knows Lessing, or ought to know him. He is the only German writer who, although treating, in his prose-works, of the most learned subjects, was yet able to write a purely Hellenic, singularly individual and beautiful style. For reasons indifferent to our present purpose this great glory of the Fatherland has

during the last twenty-five years been visited with a morbid hatred on the part of numerous Germans. One of them, Paul Albrecht—a most learned philologist, naturalist, theologian, etc., and the author of one hundred and thirty-five works bearing on a variety of subjects—published under the head-title “*Philologische Untersuchungen*,” an immense work, consisting of 2,494 pages in large 8vo, in which he “proves” that all the poems and dramas of Lessing are but vulgar plagiarisms from innumerable authors, Greek, Latin, English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, German, Swedish, etc., etc. He takes up each drama, nay, each poem by Lessing, line by line, frequently word by word, and traces it invariably to some work or other of an author of European or even non-European nationality. To enable himself to carry out his task, Albrecht went through the whole of the ocean of dramatic and lyrical literature of Europe before and during the eighteenth century, and his familiarity with comedies and tragedies of the century of Lessing is nothing short of stupendous. In its way there never has been published a more learned work, a more carefully prepared and systematically elaborated book. Since, of course, he is unable to prove direct or evident plagiarism in every

case, Albrecht has, quite in the manner of the Higher Critics, laid down rules or "theories of composition" (read: plagiarism) followed by the cunning Lessing. There is, as with the Higher Critics, an *Urkundentheorie*, a *Fragmententheorie*, an *Ergänzungstheorie*, a blend of the *Fragmententheorie* and the *Ergänzungstheorie*, etc., etc. No matter how cunningly the good Lessing tried to cover up the traces of his plagiarism, Albrecht discovers them. If they are not plagiarisms direct and palpable, they are, Albrecht says, Plagio-Peplagiomena; or Paraplagiata; or Onomatoparagoge; or Geneoparagoge, etc., etc. Thus, of "*Der junge Gelehrte*" (*The Young Scholar*), a comedy of Lessing, Albrecht literally says: "'*The Young Scholar*' is a  $\beta$ dihypomimic Ero-drama, and if we combine that with the Ero $\beta$ trimimy allotted to its Epiparallel, the whole morphological value of '*The Young Scholar*, is that of a  $\beta$ stri $\beta$ dihypomimic Ero-drama." Surely, nobody can deny *that*; and we all agree with Albrecht (for that is what he adds), "that the whole architectonics of this dramatic piece are revealed to us *in this SIMPLE expression!*"<sup>10</sup>

This is the net result of methods of Higher

<sup>10</sup> Albrecht, *Lessing's Plagiate* (1888), p. 587.

Criticism applied to a modern author. It is to be hoped that Canon Cheyne will, after reading Albrecht, declare, that although he has hitherto believed in the authorship of Lessing's dramas, he now can not but say that those dramas are only  $\beta$ tri $\beta$ dihypomimic Erodrasmas; and applying this simple term to the Psalms or Job, we may reasonably hope to arrive, in the end, at a full understanding of the real architectonics of these two so-called Biblical writings.

It was said above that the method of the Higher Critics in dealing with the text of the Bible is radically wrong. August Klostermann over twelve years ago pointed out the initial fault, the false strategy of modern Bible-criticism. He rightly says<sup>11</sup> that Astruc, in the eighteenth century, inoculated the disease,—that is, the assumption of the Bible-critics to the effect, that to “analyze” the Hebrew text of the Pentateuch *as we now have it*, is tantamount to retracing its constituent parts to their original authors. Such retracing can be done, and has indeed been done in the case of mediæval chroniclers. The monk who undertook to write a world-chronicle calmly copied out first Eutropius, or Orosius, then a mediæval predecessor, then a contemporary writer, and finally, super-

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<sup>11</sup> August Klostermann, *Der Pentateuch* (1893), p. 61

added the news current in his own abbey. Retracing or "analyzing" of such compilations is legitimate, honest, and true work. All scholars are aware of the feat of "retracing" done by Giesebrecht respecting the *Annales Altahenses maiores*.

The Pentateuch, however, is not a mediæval chronicle. It was, as Klostermann very felicitously terms it, a *Gemeinde-Lesebuch*, a popular work of edification, in the hands of every one; a blend of a Common Prayer Book and a national history; a singularly individual book; just as, one may add, the Talmud is, in its way, an unique work both in its form, in its encyclopædic range, in its spirit. Such a popular *Gemeinde-Lesebuch* must necessarily have undergone constant changes in its verbiage, style, matter. Too many people handled it; too many copied it; too many different copies were extant in the various households. Klostermann aptly refers to the great changes that Lutheran hymns have undergone in a few centuries. Still more cogent examples might be adduced from a study of Greek palimpsests; of the various "redactions" of the Finnish Kalevala; of the Arabic Moallakat and other Oriental literature, etc., etc. Under these conditions it is mathematically certain that, even if all the Bible critics



should absolutely agree as to the authors of the respective layers and sub-layers of the Bible—which, of course, they are very far from doing—even then nothing would be proved as to the Pentateuch being a *cento*. It would not be proved, because it can not be proved. It is like asking a geometrician how many lines are in a plane of three feet square? He *can not* answer the question. You can not count the number of lines in a plane; a plane does not consist of lines. In the same way, a popular book of education, going through an untold number of copyists and generations, undergoing the greatest possible changes in form and structure, *if not also in its religious and historical essentials*, can not *now* be reconstructed into its original constituent parts. Not now; for we have at present only one of the latest versions of that text, and not a *cento* patched up from the works of the original author, or authors.

The dilemma, the inextricable dilemma, for the Bible critics stands therefore as follows:

If the Pentateuch be a *cento* or patchwork from numerous authors, we can not, at the present period, possibly go back as far as the real, the original authors; in that we do not possess a Pentateuch containing compilations from the original authors; but only a Pentateuch con-

taining versions of compilations from compilations compiled from other compilations from authors, the very last ones of whom only, now long lost, were the original authors.

If the Pentateuch is not, or is not essentially, a cento, then modern Bible criticism is altogether wrong and futile.

Hic Rhodus, hic salta.

. . . . .

The philological historians totally misunderstand the most fundamental character of all classical history; *i. e.*, that of the Hebrews, Phœnicians, Hellenes, and Romans. This character consists in the fact that all classical history is cephalic; it is grafted upon and living in Personality. Pre-classical history knows only of Persons; classical history knows, for the first time in history, of Personalities. This cephalic character is all-decisive, all-important. It is the soul of classical antiquity. Now, what have the philologians and the philological historians done these one hundred and fifty years? They have, in the most absurd manner, attempted to shut out from classical history the very essence thereof: Personality. Moses, David, Lyeurgus, Theseus, Romulus, Homer, etc., etc.,—they are all myths. Of course, they are all the most real beings in history. Philological or “Higher”

Critics can not see the broadest, plainest, and most important fact of classical antiquity, that glorious Chain of Personalities from Moses to Cæsar, who, by establishing cephalic States, made it possible that the Universal Church was finally introduced by one Personality greater than all the rest.



### CHAPTER III.

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE METHOD. THE IN-  
QUISITORIAL PRINCIPLE.



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It is difficult to refute Higher Criticism, or rather to confute the Higher Critic. He is, as will presently be seen, not in a position to grasp the force of the powerful arguments militating against his views. He is like a person absolutely devoid of any musical ear, at a concert. Such an individual really does not hear the music played; he only perceives incoherent, hence disagreeable noises. No wonder he dislikes music. He has never heard music *quâ* music; he has heard a din. The Higher Critic is fundamentally vitiated by his angle of viewing, by his manner of looking at things; in short, by his method. The historians of Science or of Philosophy have long established that one of the most formidable obstacles in the way of scientific progress is the application of a false method. Whether Bacon was or was not right in holding that by means of the right method a

mediocre talent may in the end equal a genius, it remains certain that the use of a wrong method has, sometimes for centuries, crippled the advance of knowledge. It can not be doubted that when a given research requires the careful use of the Method of Comparison, or that of direct Experimenting; no other method, ever so subtle and careful, will do. Statistics based on non-comparative methods; physiology studied departmentally; economics based on mathematical theorems alone, etc., etc.,—all this can but end in failure.

Having shown the failure of Higher Criticism from other standpoints, we must now approach our subject from the standpoint of Method. We are going to prove that the failure of that pernicious attempt to drain the Bible of all its inestimable value is based on a method as wrong, as unscientific, as untrue, as was that of botany in the sixteenth, or that of chemistry in the seventeenth century. This is indeed a point of the utmost importance. By far the majority of the public bow to Higher Criticism out of a vague yet very strong feeling of awe caused by the alleged scientific character of that criticism. People really do think that Higher Criticism is part of that undoubted scientific progress in which we moderns all



glory; of which all of us, without distinction of party, are so proud. Higher Criticism is viewed by these misguided souls in the light of Evolutionism, of the marvelous new departure in the science of electricity, or the latest advance made in chemistry. The sad truth is that Higher Criticism is an act of retrograde, decadent science; an act, a method long condemned and laughed at in various other branches of historical and legal study. This can fortunately be rendered as clear as daylight by a closer consideration of the method of Higher Criticism. We now invite the fair-minded student to an examination of that method.

Before giving this method of Higher Criticism its proper technical name, we are bound to premise a few remarks on the true nature of the real and ultimate object of Higher Criticism.

It is well known that the Higher Critics have, from Father Simon in the seventeenth century, and the physician Astruc in the eighteenth century (both Frenchmen), to De Wette, Eduard Reuss, Bleek, Graf, Kuenen, Bishop Colenso, Wellhausen, and several modern British scholars, essayed to prove in books of an apparently imposing erudition and "scientific" precision, that the Pentateuch, amongst other portions of

the Old Testament, consists of various layers of old, young, or fabricated documents, written by various post-Mosaic Hebrews, such as the "Elohists" (designated E.), the "Jahwist" (J.), the second "Elohists" (E. 2), the "Deuteronomist" (D.), respectively; and was finally deliberately "harmonized" by the priests about 444 B. C., Ezra and Nehemiah having the greatest share in the "codification." The number of these alleged authors of the Pentateuch, as well as the mutual relations of their respective writings, have, by the said critics and their followers, been varied and multiplied *in infinitum*. According to their view, the Hebrews previous to the eighth century B. C. were little, if at all, above the ordinary paganism of their neighbors, the Moabites, Philistines, Amalekites, etc. Their sojourn in Egypt, the existence of Moses, the Exodus,<sup>1</sup> the conquest of Canaan, —all this, most critics say, is highly problematic. When, however, the Assyrians invaded

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<sup>1</sup> One of the latest and most sober statements about the measure of information so far discovered in ancient Egyptian texts about Israel, Moses, the Exodus, etc., will be found in *Recueil de Travaux*, etc., for 1902, pp. 121, sq. No known Egyptian text speaks of Israelites in Egypt; *ib.* p. 124. An ancient Egyptian text, discovered by Professor Flinders Petrie, speaks of Israel in Palestine (*Contemporary Review*, May, 1896; *Revue Archéologique*, 1896, ii, p. 120.)

Israel, Amos and Hosea addressed the Hebrews with signal success; so much so that the Hebrews readily changed their heathenish, henotheist belief in Jahwe to a true belief in one ethical God. Amos and Hosea, it will be noticed, are thus credited with instilling in a crude nation a belief which none of the Greek sages ever hoped to succeed in imparting to the civilized Hellenes. After this successful invention of Monotheism, the codifiers of the next century "edited" Deuteronomy in 621 B. C.; and at last Judaism, as it has existed to the present day, was manufactured by a bland courtier, Nehemiah, who prevailed on the good-natured king of Persia graciously to allow him, Nehemiah, the floating of Judaism. Thus Judaism was established after the manner of a lying-in hospital or an orphanage.

If the preceding statements of the Higher Critics are put into plain English, they can mean but one thing, to-wit, that the Pentateuch is practically a forgery. Some Higher Critics, it is true, afraid lest the ultimate results of their investigations should shock the pious of the land too violently, have repeatedly attempted to declare and show that, although their "scientific" conscience does not permit them to revoke the "well-ascertained" results of Higher

Criticism, yet they, the critics, do not in the least mean to cast any doubt whatever upon the inspiration, sanctity, and religious sacredness of the Bible. In other words, to speak German, such Higher Critics want to wash the fur without making it wet. It is hardly credible that any person of common sense can be taken in by such a childish procedure. He who believes that the Pentateuch is practically a concoction of the seventh and fifth centuries B. C., and not the work of Moses in the fourteenth or thirteenth century B. C., does thereby explicitly admit that the Pentateuch is a forgery, and that therefore the Pentateuch can not possibly be regarded as an integral portion of a Holy Book revealing to us a religion vouchsafed to the Israelites by Providence in a definite place and at a definite time. *Tertium non datur.* No logical fence can enable a man to wriggle out of the meshes of this inexorable alternative. It is here, at this juncture of the debate, quite unnecessary to refer to the testimony of the Savior Himself, who formally and repeatedly recognized the Pentateuch and the Prophets as the authentic works of Moses and the God-inspired leaders of His nation. It is quite sufficient to point out the inherent contradiction in terms in the statement of those who, while tearing

down every wall, column, and pillar of the Sacred House, still continue to pretend that they do not in the least attempt to interfere with its quality as an inhabitable building. This strange section of Higher Critics does indeed advance that Higher Criticism is only an investigation of the text, the authorship, the time and place of origin of the various books of the Old and New Testament. From this apparently innocent occupation with mere words, names, chronological and topological questions no inference can be drawn, these gentlemen contend, with regard to their intention of destroying the doctrinal portion of the Bible. However, as will be seen presently, no one can so much as hope to separate verbal and chronological criticism from criticism historical. The meritorious and the formal are indissolubly united in these questions. You can not have a right view of the text, authorship, and date of, say, the Book of Kings, and yet continue to have a wrong historical view of the events and institutions of the period of Kings. If you believe, as most Higher Critics do, that there never was an Exodus, hence that there never was a Moses, then you can not possibly treat the text-criticism of the Book called Exodus in the right manner either. What would Professor Lindsay, of St.

Andrew's University, say to a critic of the text of Plautus (of the second century B. C.) who would start with the assumption that the comedies of that Roman were written in the fourth century *after* Christ? Or, suppose a modern critic started with the conviction that *Hamlet* or *Richard III* was really written by Chaucer in the fourteenth century, because the assumption of the existence of one William Shakespeare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was much too absurd. Could that person ever hope to edit Shakespeare correctly?

It is indeed for this very separation of philological from historical criticism that most of the immense amount of work of modern philological critics, whether in the sphere of Bible criticism or in that of Græco-Roman antiquity, has been absolutely sterile. It is as impossible to "criticise" text, authorship, and period of the various books of the Bible by the aid of purely philological methods of research as it is to criticise facts of physics by the aid of merely mathematical methods of investigation. Both need the lifegiving control of Reality, which in the former case is called History, in the latter Experiment.

If, then, the pretended text-criticism of the Bible is not and can not be made independent of

historic construction, then it is, by implication, impossible to admit that he who apparently only criticises the text, does not at the same time touch upon the religion contained in the Bible. That religion is based on a series of facts. It is not an abstract chain of metaphysical doctrines. It is wound up with a series of great, ever-memorable facts. Moses is not only a name, he is an event; an event of the very greatest significance; he has indeed long become a vast institution. From being at first only a person, he became a Personality, afterwards an Event, and finally a religious Institution. He who does not see that, is unable to seize or grasp the elements of either history or religion. For him, Moses is probably an ancient emigration agent or a *trekker*. It is even so with the Judges, the Kings, the Prophets. They are not only men who lived once upon a time, and did various things good, bad, and indifferent. This is the view of philologists who are accustomed to deal with words only; that is, with things between which there is, *per se*, no great difference whatever. But to the student of history there is a great deal of difference between a Hebrew prophet and an Assyrian or Babylonian seer. The prophets of Israel were at once religious phenomena and historical events. They

were, to use Roman law-terms, both *res juris* and *res facti*. It was not only their teaching in the abstract, but also their preaching in the concrete, that went to constitute them what they were. One may be quite indifferent to the time when Spinoza's *Ethica* was published; one may very well ignore that time altogether, without losing a particle of the value of some of the ideas of the great thinker. His work is a book in the abstract; it gains, rather than loses, when detached from its accidental surroundings in seventeenth-century Holland. Not so the Prophets. Theirs is, in addition to an internal and imperishable value, a distinct place in time and space. They are both thought and deed; they are persons and facts: to separate these two powers is impossible. Had Moses not done what he did, he could not have taught what he taught. Had Lycurgus not guaranteed the political independence and power of Sparta against the neighboring princes and peoples of Messene, Tegea, Argos, etc., he would not, and could not, have taught his famous system of national education as he did. This system is not the result of idle construction and scheming in the abstract, such as many a schoolmaster has indulged in, in his study. It is the necessary outcome of a highly endangered position of a nation. The philolog-



ical historian who is unacquainted with Reality, looks upon Lyeurgus as he does upon *Madame la directrice* of a high school for young ladies. This enables him to deprive poor Lyeurgus of the most positive advantage the great Spartan ever had: historical existence. In the same way, then, Moses and the Prophets are treated. It is ignored that their teachings are one and the same thing with their doings; it is overlooked that should any one prove that they never did what they are said to have done, then their teachings would be the greatest of all miracles, the least comprehensible things in the world. What they taught, and the way they taught it, can not be picked up in any sleepy corner of an Oriental bazaar. In their thoughts there are the tears of the greatest national anguish, the desperate longings of exiles and outlaws, the deep insight into life given only by intense national suffering and national grandeur.

It thus remains incontestable that as philological or "merely" textual criticism of the Bible can not be separated from criticism historical, even so historical criticism of the Bible can not be separated from criticism religious. They, therefore, that deny or question the received authorship, text, and dates of the books of the Bible—*i. e.*, the Higher Critics—do thereby

declare that the Bible is a forgery. It is with them as it is with M. Hochart, who holds that Tacitus was not written by Tacitus in the second century A. D., but by Poggio Bracciolini, a well-known Italian of the fifteenth century, A. D.<sup>2</sup> For M. Hochart, the Tacitus that we now possess is a forgery. Nothing short of this term can possibly be used. It is hopeless to look for another term in the case of criticism *à la* Hochart when applied to the Bible. The Bible, and certainly the Old Testament, which has so far received more attention on the part of the Higher Critics in England and America than has the New Testament,—the Old Testament is, by Higher Criticism, declared to be a forgery.

Now, forgery is a crime. The question, then, whether the Higher Critics have or have not made good their case, is eminently a question of evidence and proof in criminal procedure. It is a question referring to the law of crimes and criminal procedure. This, as every one knows, is one of those matters regarding which we have, in the last hundred and fifty years,

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<sup>2</sup> Hochart, *De l'authenticité des Annales et des Histoires de Tacite* (Paris, 1890); and *Nouvelles considérations au sujet d. Annales et d. Hist. de Tacite* (Paris, 1894). See *contra*: Tannery, *Annales de la Faculté de Bordeaux* (1890, 1891).

made some undeniable progress. This progress is very much more perceptible on the Continent than in England. In the latter country criminal procedure was at all times very much less tainted with the abominable vices of criminal procedure on the Continent during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and most of the eighteenth centuries. The progress and reforms made in modern criminal law and procedure stand out, therefore, much more plastically in Continental history. The vices here referred to have long been summed up under the name of "inquisitorial procedure." It was a criminal procedure which, in the face of all elementary fairness and justice, started with the assumption of guilt on the part of the accused. The judge was party, barrister, juror, and judge, all in one person; he cross-examined, he accepted or refused witnesses; he used the terrible method of proof by *indicia*, or mere symptoms, vague interpretations of facts, arbitrary assumptions, and what was called *presumptiones juris*. When all the resources of diabolical insinuation seemed to fail, then recourse was had to torture; and it is superfluous to show how, under these circumstances, no man, once accused of a crime, more particularly of the crime of sorcery and witchcraft, could possibly escape the claws of

the senseless and pitiless judge of that time. For such an accused there was no help on earth, except, as occasionally happened, that he was able to stand all the fiendish pain of the rack without formally admitting that he or she was a sorcerer or witch.<sup>3</sup>

The odium, injustice, and inhumanity of that inquisitorial method of criminal procedure can not be described in general terms. One must read the acts of witch-trials. One has to descend into the fearful dungeons, where, by the aid of that method, old and young women, *nay, girls six years old*, were tortured on the plea of being witches. One woman was triumphantly "convicted" of the heinous crime, because in the third house from hers a child had died of a mysterious illness. It was evident, the inquisitorial judge said, that the child died because the woman had bewitched her. On the wretched woman's pointing out to the judge that she had never seen that child, and that in the same house another child had recovered about the same time from the same mysterious illness, the judge, quoting abundantly from the

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<sup>3</sup>In a powerful novel, "The Long Night," Mr. Stanley Weyman has given us a most dramatic and historically true picture of the social and moral atmosphere of the times when witch-trials and the inquisitorial method were rife all over Europe.

great masters of higher criminal criticism of the time, from Clarus, Farinacius, Damhouder, and others, declared, that the recovery of the other child was proof conclusive of the witchery of the accused; for, had the mysterious illness been curable, then both children would have recovered. Since only one recovered, it is *sole clarius*, that the deceased child was the only one whom the accused wanted to bewitch.<sup>4</sup>

All this is pretty well known, and the literature of the inquisitorial criminal procedure in general, and that of the witch-trials in particular, is exceedingly ample and elaborate. It is, however, far less known how the age of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the times of Copernicus, Bacon, Kepler, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Newton came to be disgraced by atrocities that, on the whole, were absolutely

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<sup>4</sup>It is well known that the mother of the great astronomer, Kepler, was accused of witchcraft, and had to undergo the ordeal of a criminal accusation launched against her, *ex officio*, by the tribunal of Leonberg, in Würtemberg, in 1620. In the edition of Kepler's works by Ch. Frisch (vol. viii, pars 1, pp., 361-562), there is a reprint of all the *rotuli*, decrees, and acts passed in that trial. As Frisch rightly says, "*Nulla (causa capitalis contra sagas) comparari possit cum hac, . . . quia res tota contra usum receptum per literas agebatur,*"—so that we have the complete material of the depositions of witnesses, pleadings, decrees, arguments, and counter-arguments of this

and relatively rare in the Middle Ages proper. With here and there a temporary exception, the Middle Ages, or more correctly speaking the period from the eighth to the fourteenth century inclusive, were practically free from both the inquisitorial procedure and witch-trials *en masse* in particular. Trials for heresy were indeed conducted after a procedure essentially inquisitorial in character. But other crimes were submitted to courts of law in which the inquisitorial principle was unknown. To what circumstance or historical cause, then, shall we ascribe the rise of that inquisitorial procedure which martyri-  


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typical case. He who is well acquainted with the tone and trend of the arguments current in the works of the Higher Critics of the Bible can not read this reprint of a witch-trial without being more than once struck with the appalling similarity, in point of mental procedure, of the trial of the Bible with the trial of the mother of the great astronomer. The public prosecutor, who is bent on bringing the old woman to the *peinliche Frage*, or torture, uses the very kind of arguments that have served the "Higher Critics" to lacerate the author of the Pentateuch. Thus, in order to show, "conclusively and irrefutably," that the old woman must be subjected to the "question"—*i. e.*, the torture—the public prosecutor points out her "*variatio et inconstantia*;" that, he says, *The Kupplerin* was inconstant, contradictory, and varying in the use of her words (*dass die Kupplerin in ihren Reden ohnbeständig, wankelmütig und in denselben variere*); just as the "Higher Critics" start with the

tims in the name of Law? To this question the strangest answers have been hazarded. Here is not the place to discuss them. Here it may suffice to state that the ignominious procedure was observed in Catholic and Protestant countries alike, and for over two hundred years. It seemed to be so deeply rooted as some immovable institution or idea of the times that the noble men who first combated it in the eighteenth century were considered to be lunatics. As late as the end of the nineteenth century no less civilized a country than France still retained an atrocious remnant of that procedure in the rights of a French *juge d'instruction*;

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“inconstant, contradictory, and varying” use of the Hebrew terms for the Godhead in Genesis. And as the Württemberg public prosecutor in 1620 comes to the conclusion, fortified by ample quotations from the criminalistic works of Clarus, Zanger, Carerius, and Bodinus, that *ex variatione autem et inconstantia sermonis judicium oriri ad torturam* (in Kepler’s *Opera*, ed. Frisch viii. 1, p. 512), even so the “Higher Critics,” quoting profusely from one another and their predecessors in the eighteenth century, arrive at the conclusion that Moses was not the author of the essential portions of the Pentateuch, and, accordingly, that he must be put to the “question” in order to make him reveal the real authors. When, however, the “Kupplerin” points out to the prosecutor that the witnesses bearing out his contention are also contradicting themselves, and that therefore their testimony ought not to pass for complete and convincing, then the public prosecutor retorts that such “slight”

and various traces thereof may be discovered even now in the criminal procedure of the German Empire and of Austria.

The cause and historic motive of the rise and long continuance of the horrible method called inquisitorial procedure we take to be the rise and continuance of "learned" or arm-chair judges, appointed for life by the Princes. Previous to the fifteenth century, judgment, whether in civil or in criminal cases, was, on the Continent, given, as a rule, by free burghesses, *scabini*, *Schoeffen*, *consules de placitis*, or whatever their titles may have been. They were neither Doctors of Law nor appointed for life; they were neither "learned men" nor arm-chair scholars. They were free men, steeped in the realities of life, knowing what human nature generally means, and therefore more conservative and conciliatory than *doctrinaire* or severe. When, however, the Italian doctors

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contradictions in the depositions of the same witness or of the incriminating witnesses must not be taken any notice of; for, he adds, *est enim prudentis providique iudicis, testimonium dicta conciliare, ut valeant potius quam perire!* Can anything be more similar to the way in which "Higher Critics" at once insist upon certain, and neglect certain other, "contradictions" in the Bible according to the measure in which these contradictions favor or do not favor the preconceived theories of those critics?



brought their new arm-chair lore of law into country after country; when the *Doctores, Glossatores, Domini* of Bologna, Padua, Pisa, etc., established the profession of "learned" judges—that is, of men who, after a more or less prolonged theoretic study of Roman law, were pitchforked into the chairs of judges, there to pronounce on the legal relations of a life diametrically opposed to the life of ancient Rome—then came the inevitable disaster. The "learned judges," disdaining the legal folklore or popular law of their country, soon manifested that acerbity of self-assertion so peculiar to bureaucrats. To raise the dignity and power of their otherwise poorly salaried offices, they were not long in discovering the immense leverage which the method of insinuation, oblique cross-examination, proof *per indicia*, and finally the torture, was bound to place in their hands. With the instinct of ruthless class-ambition, secretly countenanced by the prevailing absolutism of the Princes whose ready instruments they were, the "learned judges" very soon built up a massive and incredibly intricate system of inquisitorial procedure, which placed in their hands a weapon so extraordinary that no person in the country could afford to trifle with them. No wonder they sedulously elaborated their engine of suc-

cess, surrounding it with all the appearances of learning, the pageantry of public magistracies, and the terrors of irresistible retribution. One has only to look for a while at the portrait of a man like Carpzov of Saxony. What a terror of a face! What boundless arrogance! What relentless cocksureness!

We here submit that the same thing that happened to criminal law proper in the period when its administration was intrusted exclusively to "learned" judges, or arm-chair scholars—this very same and most pernicious thing has happened, and always will happen, to any and every subject of real life, whether law or any other research, whenever it will be exclusively handled by men unacquainted with the realities of life, and trained only for a purely abstract and bureaucratic mode of thought. In every case of that kind a method has been introduced by the arm-chair scholar which is essentially identical with the method of the inquisitorial procedure. If the subject be that of History, no actual persons are tortured. But the persons, events, institutions of the past, are subjected to the very same method of insinuation, proleptic proof, evidence *per indicia*, etc., that, when applied to living persons accused of a crime, has led, and was bound to lead, to the vilest abuse of law of

all times. For it is superfluous to show that neither the Greeks nor the free Romans dishonored themselves by the application of the inquisitorial principle. Nor did they have "learned" judges.

On going somewhat more deeply into the matter, we can not but see that all the conditions that combined to precipitate the rise of the inquisitorial method in criminal jurisdiction have been at work in the introduction of the same method to the study of History, Theology, or Archæology in the last hundred and fifty years, especially on the Continent. It is well known that particularly in Germany the "learned" studies proper—*i. e.*, Philology, History, or Theology—are almost exclusively in the hands of professional, arm-chair scholars, or professors. Their posts they obtain by ponderous treatises; their fame is based on books of heavy erudition; their horizon, their basis, hope, and joy are determined by books, and nothing but books. They are, in fact the *Doctores* and *Glossatores* of our time. They ignore Reality for a variety of reasons. As a rule, they are too poor to have seen more than a few minor aspects of great life; still worse, they spend their receptive years, up to thirty-five, exclusively in libraries, so that subsequent acquaint-

ance with Reality finds them quite impermeable to new impressions. Like the *Doctores*, although unfitted to grapple with any concern of life, they yet constantly deal with problems of life, past or present, with History or Theology. The same class-ambition that prompted the "learned" judges of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the same overbearing self-assertiveness of the bureaucrat that filled the hearts of those judges, now fills the hearts of the arm-chair historian or theologian in Germany, and largely also in France. Their ambition is indeed boundless. Although nobody brings any pressure upon them to this purpose, yet they slave away year after year at the elaboration of some stupendously erudite work on History, Philology, or Theology. Naturally, they want to be recognized as *the* masters of the subject. He who is not of the profession is either silenced by neglect, or positively condemned by haughty vituperation. Buckle, in their view, is a dilettante; so is Pater, Grote, Froude, J. G. Frazer, Joseph Ferrari, Motley, Duruy, Riehl. For what they are really after is to wield the same absolutism in History and Theology that their forerunners in the law-courts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wielded in point of Law. In the interest of that great aim,

nothing is more efficient than the inquisitorial method; the method of learned and malicious insinuation, that rapidly throws about one the halo of "singular sagacity," and "penetrating insight;" the method of proof by mere *indicia*, which at once clothes you in the wide gown of a *Doctor subtilissimus*; the method of torturing single words and phrases until all their natural meaning has been racked out of them. To employ this method, both a peculiar *état d'âme*, and a peculiar erudition à la Archbishop Ussher or Pfeffinger are required. This is unobtainable for the normal man outside the professorial career; and accordingly, History, Theology, and Philology are at present almost exclusively under the weight of an Absolutism which the nations of Europe have long shaken off in spheres political and social.

To come now to our immediate point. It is here maintained that the "Higher Critics" of the Bible are to all intents and purposes the "learned judges" of former ages; that, for the same psychological motives that actuated those judges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to employ, in ever more "refined" ways, the inquisitorial method, the "Higher Critics" of the Bible are employing the same pernicious and sterile method; and, finally, that the

“Higher Critics” of the Bible, far from applying mental processes and methods of research approved by the true spirit of scientific thought, are, on the contrary, the victims, or worse, of the same thoroughly unscientific and inhuman delusion that was, *in ultima analysi*, the real cause of the horrors of witch-trials and religious persecution.

To illustrate and fully prove the preceding statement, we need only relate the story of the “Higher Criticism” of Genesis xiv. For clearness’ sake we first subjoin the text :

And it came to pass in the days of Amraphel king of Shinar, Arioch king of Ellasar, Chedorlaomer king of Elam, and Tidal king of nations ;

2 That these made war with Bera king of Sodom, and with Birsha king of Gomorrah, Shinab king of Admah, and Shemeber king of Zeboiim, and the king of Bela, which is Zoar.

3 All these were joined together in the vale of Siddim, which is the salt sea.

4 Twelve years they served Chedorlaomer, and in the thirteenth year they rebelled.

5 And in the fourteenth year came Chedorlaomer, and the kings that were with him, and smote the Rephains in Ashteroth Karnaim, and the Zuzims in Ham, and the Emims in Shaveh Kiriathaim,

6 And the Horites in their mount Seir, unto El-paran, which is by the wilderness.

7 And they returned, and came to En-mishpat, which is Kadesh, and smote all the country

of the Amalekites, and also the Amorites, that dwelt in Hazezon-tamar.

8 And there went out the king of Sodom, and the king of Gomorrah, and the king of Admah, and the king of Zeboiim, and the king of Bela (the same is Zoar;) and they joined battle with them in the vale of Siddim;

9 With Chedorlaomer the king of Elam, and with Tidal king of nations, and Amraphel king of Shinar, and Arioch king of Ellasar; four kings with five.

10 And the vale of Siddim was full of slime-pits; and the kings of Sodom and Gomorrah fled, and fell there; and they that remained fled to the mountain.

11 And they took all the goods of Sodom and Gomorrah, and all their victuals, and went their way.

12 And they took Lot, Abram's brother's son, who dwelt in Sodom, and his goods, and departed.

13 And there came one that had escaped, and told Abram the Hebrew; for he dwelt in the plain of Mamre the Amorite, brother of Eshcol, and brother of Aner: and these were confederate with Abram.

14 And when Abram heard that his brother was taken captive, he armed his trained servants, born in his own house, three hundred and eighteen, and pursued them unto Dan.

15 And he divided himself against them, he and his servants, by night, and smote them, and pursued them unto Hobah, which is on the left hand of Damascus.

16 And he brought back all the goods, and also brought again his brother Lot, and his goods, and the women also, and the people.

17 And the king of Sodom went out to meet him after his return from the slaughter of Chedorlaomer, and of the kings that were with him, at the valley of Shaveh, which is the king's dale.

18 And Melchizedek king of Salem brought forth bread and wine: and he was the priest of the most high God.

19 And he blessed him, and said, Blessed be Abram of the most high God, possessor of heaven and earth:

20 And blessed be the most high God, which hath delivered thine enemies into thy hand. And he gave him tithes of all.

21 And the king of Sodom said unto Abram, Give me the persons, and take the goods to thyself.

22 And Abram said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth,

23 That I will not take from a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take any thing that is thine, lest thou shouldest say, I have made Abram rich:

24 Save only that which the young men have eaten, and the portion of the men which went with me, Aner, Eshcol, and Mamre; let them take their portion.

This whole chapter, Nöldeke, Wellhausen, and so many other "Higher Critics" say, is simply a very late interpolation, *i. e.*, a forgery. Says Wellhausen: "That 'at the time of Abraham' four kings from the Persian Gulf made a *razzia* (or raid) as far as the peninsula of



Sinai; that they, on that occasion, surprised and captured five city princes who reigned in the Dead Sea; that finally Abraham, at the head of three hundred and eighteen servants, fell upon the departing victors, and recaptured what they had robbed,—these are simply impossibilities.”<sup>5</sup>

No unprejudiced reader can for a moment fail to see that the mental process here used by Wellhausen is painfully identical with the mental process used by the “learned judges” of the times of the inquisitorial principle in criminal law. Wellhausen, after relating the commonest occurrences of all history; that is, raids made by some kings into the territory of other princes; captures of men and goods; a military surprise of the departing victors at the hands of a clever leader, who attacks their rear guard; Wellhausen, we say, after relating these most commonplace and but too likely events of ordinary warfare, suddenly delivers himself of the statement, or rather judgment, that “all this is simply impossible.”

Why is it impossible, *Doctor subtilissime*? Why? Are not raids as common in all history as are sharks in the sea? Do we not know of hundreds of raids and campaigns of Assyrian,

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<sup>5</sup> Wellhausen, J. *Die Composition des Hexateuch* (third edition), Berlin, 1899, p. 312.

Babylonian, Elamite, Hittite, Egyptian, and other rulers, very many of which were directed against the country they called Martu, or the West; *i. e.*, Syria and Palestine? Do we not pertinently know that Hammurabi, King of Babylon in the twenty-second or twenty-third century B. C., extended his rule to the Mediterranean?<sup>6</sup> Do we not positively know that Babylonian influence was, in some respects, paramount in Western Asia for over a thousand years, and that such influence can not have been acquired without a certain military superiority of the Babylonians? Have we not inscriptions on the so-called Omina slab relating of such raids into Western countries under Sargon of Agade, a Babylonian sovereign, who ruled long before Abraham and Hammurabi?<sup>7</sup> On the strength of what reasonable argument are we entitled to deny *prima facie* credibility to the statement of Genesis xiv?

There is no such reasonable argument. In

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<sup>6</sup>See an inscription in the British Museum, referred to by Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen* I, pp. 145-146. See also on Babylonian invasions of the West, after Hammurabi, Pinches, in *Records of the Past*, 2d series, vol. v, pp. 102-105.

<sup>7</sup>See Schrader's *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, III, 1, p. 103; and Thureau-Dangin, in *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions* (Paris 1896, month of August.)

reading chapter xiv of Genesis, no fair-minded historian can say that the facts related therein are "simply impossibilities." To say so, is to be unwarrantably arbitrary. To say so, is to act precisely as acted the "learned" judges of the age of the inquisitorial principle. They, too, laid down the condemnation of the accused long before the latter had been convicted by any semblance of real evidence. They laid it down, simply because they wanted to do so; because they were anxious to assert their power, to "make a case," or to win the applause of their absolutist prince. There is not a shadow of real evidence discrediting the story of Genesis xiv. About the names of the kings therein mentioned we shall see presently. About the facts themselves there can be no initial or logical doubt whatever. One may subsequently prove that these facts, likely and natural in themselves, have yet never taken place. Not everything that is likely is for this reason alone also real. We are, however, speaking here of the initial attitude of the historian to Genesis xiv. Wellhausen, *a limine*, or from the very outset, condemns the chapter, because it contains things "simply impossible." This he has no right whatever to do; not the palest shadow of a right. That chapter contains no impossibilities what-

ever. But Wellhausen, like all the rest of the Higher Critics, is in reality not a critic, but a sixteenth or seventeenth century criminal judge. He treats the crime of forgery imputed to the "interpolator" of Genesis xiv, in the manner and after the methods of Carpzov or Damhouder, or any other criminal judge of the seventeenth century. He lays it down from the outset, "*ex plenitudine juris mei*," that this "interpolator" has indeed forged the chapter. Then he proceeds to prove the forgery. In vain the "interpolator" exclaims: "Consider, O Judge, the names of the kings! It was said formerly that all these names were 'free inventions' of mine. Have these names not been borne out in the last thirty years by authentic inscriptions from the second millennium B. C.? Is not every one name a real name? Has not the Assyriologist George Smith, in 1871, shown that Arioch, king of Ellasar, in verse 1 of Genesis xiv, was, according to authentic inscriptions, a real king whom Hammurabi once defeated? Did not the same George Smith show, in the same unimpeachable manner, that the name of King Chedorlaomer of Elam, mentioned in verse 1 of Genesis xiv, is indeed a true Elamite name, Lagamar being the name of an Elamite goddess, and Kudur having been found in the

authentic names of Elamite Kings, such as Kudur-Mabuk, and Kudur-Nanchundi? And has not Mr. Pinches found the full name of Kuturlagamar (Chedorlaomer) in a Chaldæan document?"<sup>8</sup>

There is no modern court of law where the preceding arguments of the "interpolator" would not be accepted as complete and irrefutable evidence for the above statement, that Genesis xiv does *not* contain anything that can in common fairness be called "simply impossible" from the very outset. There is no modern judge but would recognize that Wellhausen's initial dictum of "simply impossible" is hopelessly absurd and arbitrary. Historic impossibilities are either chronological, topical, logical, psychological, or technical. There are no other impossibilities with regard to historic facts. We have condemned certain records as relating impossibilities, because they contained a flagrant incongruence in point of time, or in point of

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<sup>8</sup>See *The Academy* for September 7, 1895, p. 189. G. Smith and most Assyriologists (Oppert, Delitzsch-Mürdter, Hommel, etc.) have always accepted Genesis xiv as a record of historic facts; while the majority of "Higher Critics" (Reuss, Nöldeke, in 1869, Wellhausen, etc.) have refused to accept that chapter as an authentic statement of events of the times of Ham-murabi. See the elaborate notes in Maspero's *Histoire Ancienne*, vol. ii (1897), pp. 48, 49, 50.

space; likewise, because they contained what is illogical, or psychologically impossible; and, finally, because they contain a technical, or what the Germans call *sachliche*, impossibility. Does Genesis xiv contain any such ground for the *initial* assumption of "impossibilities?" None whatever.

However, as said above, the Higher Critic is not a modern judge. He is a judge of the seventeenth century. He deals not with facts, and such conclusions from facts, as are psychologically justifiable. He deals with the inquisitorial method of browbeating facts and witnesses, of poisoning statements by diabolical insinuations, and of bullying everybody by declaring the most likely things "absolute impossibilities." For, what indeed has been the answer of the Higher Critics to the arguments of the "interpolator" above stated? Here is their answer:

"The accused (interpolator) refers to the slight error committed by the previous judges (Higher Critics) in declaring, as they did, that all the names of kings in Genesis xiv were free inventions of his. We do not say at present, that they were. Those names are really names of Oriental kings of Elam, Ellasar, and Shinar. The previous judges, for reasons that the ac-

cused would not be able to follow, and which therefore it behooves us at present to conceal, did not choose to admit their knowledge of the authenticity of those names. But even admitting, as we now do, that these kings of Shinar, Ellasar, and Elam, as named in Genesis xiv, were indeed authentic kings of those countries, we can not at all admit that this merely external circumstance can in any way exonerate the accused of his heinous crime. The names are true. But will any one undertake to prove that those names could not have been copied out by the accused from some old records in Babylon? Could he, a child of the fifth century B. C., not have repaired to Babylon, and getting information from Babylonian priests and historians, 'write up' Genesis xiv, as if this chapter were a document from the beginning of the second millennium, or relating authentic facts of that time? Note our sagacity. Is it not superbly subtle to have pointed out this most unlikely act of literary forgery? Is such sagacity, such lightning flashes of 'presumptional' thinking, such *sorites* of hypothetical concatenations *ἐνθυμήματα* and *ἐπιχειρήματα* not in itself a full proof of the most reprehensible act of the accused? Here is, apparently, an authentic record in Genesis xiv. With the

usual wiliness of hardened criminals, the accused repairs stealthily to Babel, bribes priests, filches Babylonian documents, copies old records, and imbuing himself with the atmosphere of the second millennium B. C., 'writes up' a chapter of history that is, in all its outward appearance and inward probability, a most plausible piece of literary forgery. Mark the coincidence of outward appearance with inward probability. In authentic things there is, as a rule, a certain slight but natural discrepancy between what we call outer and inner probability. External reality is always somewhat of a blurred mirror of existence internal. The subjective does not correspond fully to the objective, nor the spiritual to the material. But in inauthentic and illegal acts there is just that complete correspondence between inside and outside, between soul and body, heart and act, that to the experienced and truly learned judge reveals the crime. The criminal, by his very attempt to create a pleasing harmony between names, dates, places, and inner probability of events, reveals the criminal nature of his action. True, none but a trained intellect will discover such subtle traces of misdeeds. But it is equally true that such an intellect *will* discover it. Or, is it not *lucē meridiana clarius* that this very



coincidence of correct names with probable events in Genesis xiv calls for the application of that powerful, nay, irresistible and acknowledged principle, that 'too plausible a probability is rightly considered to be suspect,' or, as Damhouder has it, *verisimilitudo ultra quam necesse est magna suspicionem in se trahit*. The accused, in order to prove his officially impossible innocence, has indeed advanced the ludicrous argument that had he copied his tale from Babylonian records as they existed in his time—*i. e.*, in the fifth century B. C.—he could not have written in Genesis xiv, Chedorlaomer, which in that century was unknown at Babel, but should have written Kudurlagamar, which spelling alone was current in his time.<sup>9</sup> This, far from proving his case, is one more argument against him, in that it only proves his natural attempt to cover up the traces of his forgery, and to choose from among the various forms of Kudurlaomer the one which had the most archaic appearance in sound. It is evident that the most elementary cunning of forgers of allegedly ancient documents will suffice to suggest to them the choice of the most likely verbiage and style. Is it, for instance, possible to assume that a modern forger who wants to foist a false manu-

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<sup>9</sup>Hommel, *The Ancient Hebrew Tradition* (1897), p. 165.

script of Chaucer on some silly amateur, will write it in the prose of the eighteenth century? An obscure Frenchman, by the name, if we mistake not, of Alphonse Daudet, has indeed done such an incredibly perverse thing in his novel '*L'Immortel*,' in which a member of the French Academy, and thus one of our respected colleagues, is said to have been taken in by forged manuscripts dating, apparently, from the fourteenth century, although manifestly written in the prose of nineteenth-century France. But Daudet was one of those unspeakable free lances, who will say anything, as long as they can make money by so doing. Our trained intellect can not be duped. We do know that criminals will use contemporary prose or names, lest we, conversant as we are with the prose of all ages, be put on our guard from the very beginning. Their doing so is therefore proof conclusive of forgery. To sum up, it is absolutely clear that all the arguments of the accused as to the authenticity of Genesis xiv are beyond the point, illogical, against all psychology, and therefore absolutely unacceptable."

The gentle reader who has been able to withhold his indignation and to read the judge's (or Higher Critic's) absurd discourse to the end, must kindly pardon us for inviting him to

stand the ordeal for a little longer. He has not yet learned the whole of the Higher Critic's *ars magna probandi*. Before proceeding we must again call the reader's attention to the fact that the preceding argumentation of the Higher Critic is, in tone, method, and drift, identical with the discourses of seventeenth-century judges in witchcraft trials. Read one or two such trials in the original acts. You will find the same *finasserie*, the same perverse application of moral truths, the same method of revolting insinuation. Or, if you can not easily obtain access to the musty bundles of *rotuli* of old witch-trials, read the speeches of Robespierre and other masters of diabolical invective. Purblind prejudice alone can prevent one from noticing the absolute identity of the method in both cases. Or, what else shall we say of Wellhausen, whose absurd works are still enjoying such reputation in Europe and America? After having delivered himself, as we have seen, of his pompous and inane "these are simply impossibilities" with regard to Genesis xiv, he feels that some people might timidly ask themselves: "Is the mere dictum of a German Ponderosity quite sufficient to discredit an entire chapter of Genesis?" And, accordingly, Wellhausen, in order to poison the minds of these

timid believers—that is, of an, alas! but too numerous section of students and non-students—goes on saying: “They [the impossibilities implied in Genesis xiv] do not become more worthy of credence by their being placed, with great and deliberate care, in a locality that has since disappeared.”<sup>10</sup>


Wellhausen hints at the fact that the kings near (he says “in”) the Dead Sea, of whom mention is made in Genesis xiv, ruled over a territory which subsequently disappeared, as related later on in Genesis. Being unable, as we have seen, to make even the semblance of a fair case of his contention, Wellhausen now, exactly after the manner of the old judges of witch-trials, uses the poison of vile insinuation. The criminal jurist of the seventeenth century used to say, “*Is fecit cui prodest*,”—“The crime was probably made by him who profited by it.” The interpolator thus invented the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah in order to tell with impunity a story of some kings who held territory round the two doomed towns. Can learned perversity go any further?

It will be noticed that the absurdity of Well-

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<sup>10</sup> Wellhausen, *Die Composition des Hexateuchs*, etc. (3d ed, 1899, p. 312.) “*Sie werden dadurch nicht zutrauenswürdiger, dass sie mit grosser Geflissentlichkeit in eine untergegangene Welt placiert werden.*”

hausen's elaborate system of arraignment comes back, root and branch, to his initial and purely arbitrary assumption, that Genesis xiv is a forgery,—just as all the revolting proceedings of the old inquisitorial judges in witch-trials come back to their initial assumption that the accused woman *was* a witch. However, there is another and equally important point, that must be steadily kept in mind. The Higher Critics, like their forbears on the judicial benches of the seventeenth century, have practically only one category of argument, that of the Possible and its converse, the Impossible. He who will carefully peruse the works of the Higher Critics will soon convince himself that the principal engine they work with is the bald category of the Possible and the Impossible. Whatever happens to agree with what their little experience of life or thought may accept as “possible,” that they will admit. Whatever event, institution, idea, or personality does not commend itself as “possible” to their minds, that they will forthwith dismiss with the cold sneer of the pedant. The true student of history does but rarely use the formal and practically void category of the Possible and the Impossible. He is too busy discovering the relations and correlations of the psychological forces of Reality. He has long



learned to disparage the endless discussions of the mediæval or scholastic doctors about the *possibilitas absoluta*, *possibilitas ex suppositione*, *possibile logicum*, *possibile reale*, etc., which, together with the scholastic subtleties about *potentia*, occupied hundreds of thousands of scholars in the monastic schools of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries with interminable disputations ending in no appreciable result. A few examples will put the whole matter in a clear light.

One of the most moderate yet resolute Higher Critics of our time is Professor Edward König. In his "Introduction to the Old Testament" (*Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Bonn, 1893), he sincerely tries to be as just and fair as he is learned. Not the vaguest imputation of deliberate unfairness to the Pentateuch can be laid at his door. His is a painstaking, laborious, and erudite work. It is, nevertheless, a book thoroughly vitiated by that false and unscientific view of the questions raised which we here ascribe to all Higher Critics. Neither König nor Wellhausen can move outside the sphere of methods tainted with all the poison of the inquisitorial principle. A mere formal "possibility" is sufficient for König to cast the gravest doubt upon entire chapters and sections

of Genesis and Exodus. When it is urged that the expressions "without the camp," "out of the camp," in, *e. g.*, Leviticus iv, 12; xiii, 46; xiv, 3, 8; etc., clearly indicate a time when the Israelites were still in the desert during their exodus; then König literally retorts: "It is *possible* to conceive that these portions of the text referring to incidents of the wanderings of the Israelites through the desert arose in the following manner. Some of the laws and stories that originated in the period of Israel's divinely willed salvation may very well have retained their original traits, which were subsequently, when the text of Leviticus was compiled, used as parts of the narrative."<sup>11</sup> In the same way, König discredits the value of the numerous details of customs and laws Egyptian to be found in Genesis and Exodus. Could not these details, König asks, "possibly" have been inserted by a late compiler?<sup>12</sup>

Mark the enormity of the argument: Should we find no trace of Egyptian habits and customs in the portions of Genesis and Exodus relating to that country, then the Higher Critic would

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<sup>11</sup>König, E., *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1893, p. 157. The original German is uncommonly involved, but the above abridged translation does not leave out a single essential part.

<sup>12</sup>König, *l. c.* p. 159.

triumphantly exclaim: "Does not this total absence of local color of *Ægyptiaca* at once condemn the Bible stories located in Egypt? Is it conceivable that these stories, if authentic, should not have contained some traits about the country which, more than any other country, abounded in traits singular and strange?" If, on the other hand, the Higher Critic is compelled to admit that there is plenty of local color (thus, the carrying of baskets on the head, the shaving of the beard before appearing before Pharaoh, etc.) in Genesis and Exodus with regard to matters Egyptian, then he exclaims with equal triumph: "Could not this local color have been 'procured' by a late interpolator? Was it impossible to secure such details in the sixth or fifth century B. C.? Evidently not. What guarantee have we, then, of the authenticity of the Egyptian narratives of the Bible?"

This was precisely the method of the judges in witch-trials. When the accused proved an *alibi*, then the judge triumphantly retorted: "An *alibi*? Can not a witch be in two places at a time? Have not Bodinus, Delrio, Clarus, Zanger, etc., etc., conclusively shown that as witches can fly in space, so they can also be at several spots at the same time?" It can indeed not be denied that *if* witches are possible, they



may bewitch space as much as men. If it be allowed to use mere formal possibilities as arguments, then indeed it may legitimately be doubted whether König and Wellhausen are not, after all, the greatest enemies of Higher Criticism. For is it not just possible that they wrote their works in order to show up the hopeless absurdity of Higher Criticism? Much might be advanced to that effect. At any rate, it is "*possible.*" Such things have been known to happen; there are several masterpieces of Swift, and even of scholars proper, that may very well serve as precedents. Once we admit mere "possibilities," we can prove anything we like. The old Italian criminalists rightly said, on the basis of the inquisitorial principle rife in their time, "Give me two lines, two ever so trivial and commonplace lines written by any one, and I undertake to bring the writer to the gallows." Undoubtedly this is possible and feasible, but only as long as the method of inquisitorial principle is recognized. In modern criminal law it is absolutely impossible. Mere possibilities are rejected as evidence or proof. Nowadays we insist on psychological, and not on formal proof in criminal matters. Except, when people criticise the Bible. With regard to this most important of all books, we still suffer the applica-

tion of a method of criminal procedure which we have long thrown overboard when dealing with the most lowly and vulgar of criminals. The so-called crimes of the "interpolators," "redactors," "compilers" of the Pentateuch, are still proceeded with after the fashion of trials in the seventeenth century. Mere possibilities are adduced as proof conclusive; insinuations are leveled at the most natural and simple passages of the Bible; and the guilt of the "forgers" is taken for granted from the very outset.

It is high time that this scandalous witch-trial of the Bible be put an end to. It is imperative, in the interest of humanity, knowledge, and religion, that the Bible shall be subjected, if at all, to a criminal examination according to the precepts of modern criminal law. The honest student may rest convinced that the Bible can and will stand any fair criticism. He need not be afraid. The Rock of the Bible is as impregnable as is the Power that gave rise to it.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE THEORY OF NAMES, OF  
THE FOREIGNER, AND OF MYTHS.



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE ARGUMENT FROM THE THEORY OF NAMES, OF THE FOREIGNER, AND OF MYTHS.

IN the preceding chapter we have shown that the method used by the Higher Critics is as pernicious as it is unscientific. It is a method long abandoned, and, to speak plainly, despised by all real students of history, philology, and theology. It is as antiquated and obsolete as it is unsound and perverse. It is destructive and unfounded. It is the method by means of which the most astounding and now avowed bankruptcy of knowledge of all the ages of study and research has been brought about. For it is well known that the same method that the Higher Critics of the Bible have been using, has in the last one hundred and thirty years been applied to the origins of our civilization, and with the same discreditable result. The inquisitorial principle, when applied to phi-

lology and to the origins of language, religion, "races," and history generally, stands at present convicted of a hopeless bankruptcy of results. By the middle of the nineteenth century, indeed, it was held that the great philologists, or inquisitorial judges of words, had firmly established the following interesting "truths" about our primeval history:

(1) With the exception of a few nations, such as the Finns, Hungarians, Turks, etc., all the white peoples of Europe are Aryans, whose ancestors originally lived in Central Asia, from where they spread southward and westward.

(2) Their original language was Aryan, to which idiom Sanskrit stood nearest, so that Sanskrit may practically be taken as the oldest of the Aryan languages.

(3) Their religion, too, was originally one, the Aryan religion, and both Greek and Norse mythology, Indian religion, etc., came originally from the old Aryan stock, as witness the famous equation Jupiter=Diaus-pitar.

(4) All our plants, implements—in short all the instruments of our civilization—come from the central or western portion of Asia.

(5) As against the pure and ideal Aryans, there was the other, inferior "race" of the Semites, who, in language, religion, laws, and cus-

toms, were quite, or “racially,” different from the Aryans and Indo-Germans.

He who, by the middle of the last century, should have ventured to doubt the preceding “splendid” results of the philological method based on the inquisitorial principle, would have risked literary extermination. To doubt Pott, Bopp, the Grims, Max Müller, Benfey, etc., seemed sacrilegious. Yet a fearful revulsion of opinion has since taken place, and *not one of the above five statements is at present accepted by the majority of students.*<sup>1</sup>

Whoever carefully reads the interesting essay by M. S. Reinach, quoted in the preceding footnote, will be in a position to gauge aright the complete insolvency of a method that has these hundred and thirty years so signally misled us

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<sup>1</sup>In 1879 M. de Saussure dethroned Sanskrit as the “oldest Aryan language” (Reinach, S., *Manuel de Philologie*, 1884, II, p. 173). We now accept the opinion of Bergaigne (*La religion védique*, 1883), that the Vedas do not go back to a period more ancient than Homer. Mannhardt, and especially Otto Gruppe (*Die griechischen Culte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orientalischen Religionen*, 1887), have emancipated Greek mythology from “Aryan” suzerainty. Penka has successfully traced the original seats of the Indo-Germans to Europe (*Die Herkunft der Aryer*, 1886); etc., etc. See the excellent essay by S. Reinach, *Le Mirage Oriental*, in his *Chroniques D'Orient*, 1896, vol. ii, pp. 509-565.

about the realities of the past. In this statement there is, we beg to repeat it, nothing very novel. What we claim to have been hitherto ignored; what we must insist upon as a matter of the highest, if neglected, importance, is this, that that insolvency was, and is, due to the application of the same method that in previous centuries was allowed to disgrace the tribunals of Europe, and to outrage the conscience of humanity. What is here demanded as a fact of scientific research is this, that the method of the so-called Higher Criticism of the Bible is the same method that in law has led to witch-trials; in philology, to the Aryan vagaries; in primeval history, to the wholesale dislocation of events; in Greek and Roman history, to the radical distortion of all the real issues and personalities of that memorable period, as the author has shown in detail in his "General History."

We may now turn to the consideration of the right method of studying a book like the Bible. We may now say a few words, and give a few examples, with regard to the real method to follow. And first as to its name. If the method of the Higher Critics must be called philological and inquisitorial, ours may in fairness be termed psychological. The philological method



is so unsatisfactory in any serious study of the Bible and of the events related therein, that we do not hesitate to say that even the opinions of such philologists as resolutely oppose the Higher Critics, and whom we gladly welcome in our circle, can yet not be held to be decisive opinions. We honor and love the men; we fight shy of their methods. To these men belongs, in the first place, Hommel.

Professor Hommel, of Munich University, is one of the ablest and, in point of linguistic accomplishments, one of the most erudite of Bible students. He is quite opposed to the views of the Higher Critics, and has, in consequence, suffered to a certain extent in his academic position, as he has declared to the author of the present work. In Germany the authority of the Wellhausen school is so great, it is considered to be so thoroughly scientific (or rather "*wissenschaftlich*"), that any person that opposes it, at once calls down upon himself the ignominy of "retrograde dilettantism." Professor Hommel has, in a series of books, articles, and reviews contributed a very considerable mass of new facts and new ideas which, when properly used, can not but strengthen the view of the bankruptcy of Higher Criticism. For all this, the serious student of the Bible and of Biblical

history can not but thank him most sincerely and devoutly.

It is, however, not possible to approve of his exclusive use of the philological method in matters of history. In this respect Professor Hommel is still under the spell of the prevalent mental turn of German historians. For various social and historical reasons, the German scholars have at all times attached an undue value to the efficiency of the philological elaboration of problems of history. They take up words of some ancient language, analyze them, group them, let on them play the waters of their minds in a variety of showers, and thus press out of them all manners of statements of social institutions, political facts, religious beliefs, etc. This is convenient; it is also very learned. It lends itself to a bewildering array of erudite footnotes *à la* Selden or Salmasius. But it is hopelessly wrong. Language can not help us to penetrate to the psychological forces producing the events of history. History is action, and the grammar of action is *toto cælo* different from the grammar of language. Action is, to go for a moment to the philosophic root of the matter, —action is essentially Heraclitic; while language is fundamentally Eleatic. Language must assume the substantiality of things in or-

der to house and fix them in permanent words. Action comes from and proceeds to an unending flux of things. Of all modes and methods of historical research, then, language is the poorest. He who has a practical and thorough knowledge of one or two Latin (Romance) idioms, of one or two Germanic languages, and of one or two Slav or "Turanian" idioms, has long learned the important truth that there is, for the purposes of the historian, no more misleading instrument of research than language. In fact, it may be said, that of all things illogical and absurd, language is the most illogical and the most absurd. It is a will-o'-the-wisp, a demon giving the lie to its own confession, holding out prospects it never means to keep; flirting and coquetting with six meanings at the same time; heartless, selfish, silly,—a finished killer of minds. A thousand years from now a philological historian will easily prove, from the English language, that the English people of 1905 A. D. had no will-power whatever. For, was there a word in English to express fully the French "*Je veux*," or the phrase "*Quelle volonté!*" or the German "*Ich will*," or "*Des Menschen Wille ist sein Himmereich?*" He who really knows these three languages is fully aware of the impossibility of

rendering these German and French words into short and adequate English words. *Vice versa*, although the French undoubtedly are, and have long been, recognized to be the wittiest nation of Europe and America, yet there is no adequate word in French to render the German word *Witz*, nor the English *joke*, in its conversational sense. The modern French, then, will, by the philological historian a thousand years hence, be declared to have been a nation singularly devoid of *esprit*.

Under these circumstances one must be careful not to attach any extraordinary power to arguments taken from a consideration of names only. When Victor Hehn published his "*Kulturpflanzen und Hausthiere*" (1870), in which he traced, in pleasing manner and polished style, the origin of our domestic plants and animals from the East by means of philological arguments, his efforts were greeted by his colleagues and the general public with great applause. The sober fact is, that most of the results of his researches have since been questioned, corrected, or abandoned. Even Paul Kretschmer has now declared that "a history of civilization on a linguistic basis is pure nonsense."<sup>2</sup> Keeping in

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<sup>2</sup>Kretschmer, P., *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Griechischen Sprache*, 1896, p. 50: "*Eine Kulturgeschichte auf sprachwissenschaftlicher Grundlage ist ein Unding.*"

mind all these weighty considerations of principle and fact against the usual abuse of philological methods in history, we may now attempt to allot its true value to the arguments of Professor Hommel.

In one of his most interesting works on Old Testament Criticism, in his "The Ancient Hebrew Tradition as Illustrated by the Monuments" (English edition, London, 1897), Professor Hommel lays down the following principle in the Preface, which he illustrates with the subsequent remarks and conclusions about the nomenclature of the Arabians:

"For years past I have been convinced that the question of the authenticity of the Ancient Hebrew tradition could not be finally decided until the Hebrew personal names found in the Old Testament had first been exhaustively compared with other contemporary names of similar formation, and carefully checked by them; and that all that was needed was the hand of an expert to disclose the treasures hitherto concealed in them, and to set forth the evidence they contain in such clear and convincing fashion as to render all further discussion impossible. Twenty-one years ago Eberhard Nestle,<sup>3</sup> in a valuable work, which still retains its place in the esti-

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<sup>3</sup> *Die israelitischen Eigennamen nach ihrer religiös-geschichtlichen Bedeutung*, Haarlem, 1876.

mation of scholars, endeavored to use the personal names of the Old Testament as a touchstone by which to test the authority of Hebrew tradition. Nestle correctly divided Hebrew personal names into three main groups, corresponding to the three stages of evolution observable in the religion of the Old Testament. In the first he placed names compounded with El (God); in the second those belonging to the period between Joshua and Solomon (or Elijah), in which the Divine name Yahveh comes to occupy a favored place beside El, the name of the Canaanite deity Baal (Lord) being subsequently added; and, lastly, the names of the monarchical period, containing, almost without exception, the element Yahveh (Yo, Yahu, or Yah), and thus bearing witness to the permanent victory of Yahveh over Baal. Moreover, in his explanation of the ancient Hebrew equivalents of the divine name, El—viz., *Abi*=my father; *Ammi*=my uncle—Nestle was not far wide of the mark. Indeed, this attempt of Nestle's might have found acceptance, as a solution of the Pentateuch problem, had not Wellhausen roundly asserted that the personal names of the Mosaic period, to be found in the Priestly Code, had been deliberately manufactured in later times after an earlier pattern, and that their

testimony was consequently worthless. The question was thus left in very much the same position as before.

“One of the main objects, therefore, which I have kept before me in writing the present book, has been to adduce external evidence—*i. e.*, from contemporary inscriptions—to show that, even from the time of Abraham onwards, personal names of the characteristically Mosaic type were in actual use among a section of the Semites of Western Asia, and that it is consequently useless to talk any longer of a later post-exilic invention.” . . .

“The personal names<sup>4</sup> which occur in all these inscriptions—and especially in the earliest of them, such as the Minæan and early Sabæan—are of a fairly uniform type, their main characteristics being briefly as follows:

“We are struck, first of all, by the fact that though the South Arabian religion was of a polytheistic character—as the *ex voto* offerings to the various gods conclusively show<sup>5</sup>—yet the names of the various gods are, in almost every

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<sup>4</sup> *The Ancient Hebrew Tradition as illustrated by the Monuments*, by Dr. Fritz Hommel, 1897, page 79.

<sup>5</sup> The majority of the inscriptions are *ex voto* offerings to the gods; even the few purely historical monuments partake of this character.

instance, excluded from personal names in favor of the generic term *ilu*='God.'

"The usual sequence in which the gods are mentioned in the Minæan inscriptions is as follows: *Athtar* (pronounced *Astar*) of *Kabadh*, *Wadd*, *an-Karih* (another rendering is *Nakrah*), *Athtar* of *Yahrak*, and the Lady of *Nashk*. To these some inscriptions add an "Athtar the Ascendant" (*i. e.*, apparently, the Morning Star), and an Athtar of *Yahir*. Athtar and Wadd occupy the highest place. The first of these, though originally borrowed from Babylon, and identical with the goddess *Ishtar* (the Phœnician *Astarte*), is nevertheless always represented as a male deity. He was also worshiped in the Hadramaut, though there his son *Sin* (also a Babylonian importation, but in Babylon the relationship was reversed, *Sin* being regarded as the father of *Ishtar*) took a more prominent place. As to Wadd, he is the personification of Love, just as *an-Karih*<sup>6</sup> is the personification of Hate: we have here an Arabian counterpart of the hostile brothers *Marduk*

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<sup>6</sup> This reading (in which the "n" is assumed to be equivalent to the old North Arabian article) is based on the fact that in certain South Arabian inscriptions the North-Arabian-Phœnician god *Ba'al* appears as *an-Ba'al* (according to another rendering *Nab'al*); it is, therefore, probable that *an-Karih* is originally of North Arabian origin.



and Nirgal (cf. Osiris and Set). Yet in spite of all this we scarcely ever find anything but *ilu*=God, in Minæan personal names. Wadd occurs but seldom (as in *Sa'ada-Wadd*=Wadd hath blessed it; or, better reading, *Sa'du-Wadd*=The prosperity of Wadd), *an-Karih* is not found at all; the word 'goddess' only once; viz., in *Sa'du-ilat*=Prosperity of the Goddess =Sabæan *Sa'd-Lat*; and *Athtar* but rarely, and generally in an abbreviated form, *Atht*; e. g., *Hama-Atht*=Athtar protected it; *Hauipi-Atht*=Give health, O Athtar; *Bi-Athtar*=By Athtar; and in a few other instances: far more frequent are names like *Yahmi-ilu*=May God protect, and *Hauipi-ilu*=God give health.

"We find a very similar state of things in early Sabæan inscriptions. In the Sabæan Pantheon, Athtar was also worshiped in various places and temples, but Wadd no longer accompanies him, but *Almâku-hû*=his (*i. e.*, the Heaven's) Lights; and in place of the generic "goddess" we have the Sun (Shamsun) represented as female, accompanied by a whole host of other lesser gods, who must originally have been nothing more than local deities; such as *Ta'lab*, *Aum*, etc., etc. Now, it is interesting to observe that it is not till we come to neo-Sabæan inscriptions that Shamsun, Aum, Athtar,

and other names of deities (never, it is significant to note, that of Almâku-hû) appear as the second element in personal names, and even then they do not occur nearly so often as *ilu*=God, which moreover appears frequently as a first element.

“The first deduction—and a very important deduction it is, even when taken by itself—we can draw from the above facts is, that South Arabian personal nomenclature of the earliest times contains practically no appellations save those compounded with *ilu*=God, in spite of the fact that the religion of those who bore these names was admittedly polytheistic. If we consider how frequently primitive ideas continue to persist in the personal names of any race, this would seem to indicate that there must have been a time in the history of Arabia when these gods—a number of whom, such as Athtar, Sin, and the Hadramautic deity Anbay (=Nebo), recently discovered by Glaser, were certainly imported from outside—did not receive worship, and when some higher form of devotion of a type which involuntarily reminds one of what we are told about Melchizedek in the Old Testament, must have prevailed.

“Nor is this by any means the sole deduction to be drawn from the facts. It is of special in-

terest for us to learn all that is said of God in South Arabian personal names, and particularly the special periphrases for the simple word *ilu* which were adopted in these names.

“In the first place it is characteristic that whenever the word ‘God’ appears as the first element of a name, it is nearly always accompanied by a suffix denoting the first person singular of the possessive pronoun, thus *ilî*=my God. In the following examples I have purposely chosen appellations containing such predicates as occur most frequently in the second elements. For instance:

“ <i>Ili-awwas</i>	my God has presented.
“ <i>-wahaba</i>	“ “ “ given.
“ <i>-dhara'a</i>	“ “ “ created
	(or “ “ “ sown the seed).
“ <i>-dharaha</i>	“ “ is resplendent.
“ <i>-za'ada</i>	“ “ commands awe (?).
“ <i>-yada'a</i>	“ “ is (all) knowing.
“ <i>-yapi'a</i>	“ “ shines (or is resplendent).
“ <i>-kariba</i>	“ “ has (or is) blessed.
“ <i>-ma-nabata</i>	“ “ stepped into the light, shone.
“ <i>-'azza</i>	“ “ is mighty.
“ <i>-'amida</i>	“ “ came forth (to help).
“ <i>-padaya</i>	“ “ has set free.

“ <i>Ilî-rabbi</i>	my God increase!	(probably imperative).
“ <i>-rapa'a</i>	“ “	has healed.
“ <i>-radsawa</i>	“ “	is well pleased.
“ <i>-sharraha</i>	“ “	causes to thrive.
“ <i>-shara'a</i>	“ “	has ordained, ordered.
“ <i>-sami'a</i>	“ “	“ hearkened.
“ <i>-sa'ada</i>	“ “	“ blessed.

“A large number of these predicates also occur in reverse order, and in these cases the verb preceding the word *ilu* (God) is generally in the so-called imperfect tense (with a present, or, probably, even an optative significance); *e. g.*, *Yasma'-ilu*==May God listen to it! *Yu'awwis-ilu*==May God grant it! and many others of a similar kind, including names in which occur verbs not mentioned in the above list, such as *Yadh-kur-ilu*==May God remember it!”

“We find moreover<sup>7</sup>—and here we come to the most characteristic feature of this method of name-formation—instead of the names originally beginning with the word *ili*==my God, a number of synonymous terms (to some extent periphrases of the Divine name), taking its place. The more frequent and important of these terms are *Abi*==my Father, *ammi*==my Uncle (in the sense of ‘guardian’ or ‘protector’);

<sup>7</sup> Page 84.

or, in place of it, *khâli*=my Uncle; we also occasionally find *dâdi*=my Cousin, and *akhi*=my Brother, and, lastly, *sum-hu*=His Name. But even more general expressions, such as *dhimri*=my Protection, *yith'i*=my Help (or Salvation), *nabti*=my Splendor, *tsidki*=my Justice, *wir'i*=my Feat, with a few others of still vaguer significance; such as *ma'di*, *tubba'i* (perhaps=*malki*=my King?) and *nash'i*, are used quite indifferently with *ilî*=my God. We thus obtain, at one and the same time, a confirmation of the phrases contained in the above list and a whole series of additional predicates of the Deity, as the following names—selected either for their frequent occurrence or special significance—will readily prove:

“*Abi-amara*, *Sumhu-amara*, *Khâli-amara*, *Ammi-amara*, *Yith'i-amara*, *Wir'i-amara*=My father, etc., has commanded.

“*Ammi-anisa*=My uncle is well affected.

“*Sumhu-apika*=His name is powerful (or excellent), with a strong *k*-sound.

“*Abi-wakula*, *Khâli-wakula*=My father, etc., rules.

“*Sumhu-watara*=His name is above all others.

“*Abi-dhamara*=My father was protecting.

. . .”

“By far the greater number of all these names<sup>8</sup> . . . belong to the Minæan and early Sabæan inscriptions. Careful calculations—some results of which are given elsewhere—tend to show that many of these names, and especially those beginning with *Ammi-*, *Khâli-*, and *Sumhu-*, appear less and less frequently as time goes on, and that the vogue of this whole system of name-formation practically began and ended in the earliest epochs of South Arabian history.

“In regard to the *religious significance* of this name-system, it may, I think, be confidently asserted that no parallel can be found for it in the nomenclature of any ancient people. It is true that, in so far as the attributes ascribed to the Deity are concerned, genuine Babylonian names, which we have already considered at some length, offer points of resemblance with those of South Arabia. In the Babylonian, no less than in the South Arabian, we find evidence of a belief that the Deity gives men all things that are good; that He blesses, protects, rescues, assists, and delivers; that He is mighty, and shines with a pure radiance; that He creates and preserves all things, is omniscient, just, sublime, and kingly, increases, and commands;

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<sup>8</sup> Page 86.

that He is nevertheless gracious and merciful to all who approach Him as suppliants, even as a father is to his children, and hearkens to the prayers of them that call upon Him and serve Him in holy fear. If we add to this the fact that in Babylonian names, references to 'judgment,' 'raising from the dead,' and 'forgiveness' occur with comparative frequency, it would almost seem as though the Babylonians had possessed a deeper sense of religion than the Arabs. Apart, however, from the fact that with few exceptions—as, for instance, in the case of expressions like 'hearken' 'know,' and one or two others—Babylonian and Arabic rarely employ the same or even etymologically identical verbs, but generally use totally distinct words, even when they wish to express the same or a similar meaning, there is another radical distinction between them, which places the Arabic nomenclature on a far higher and purer level than the Babylonian. I refer to its almost invariable use of the word 'God' (*ilu*) as contrasted with the polytheism observable in Babylonian names (Sin, Samas, Rammân, Nirgal, etc.). Even the synonymous alternatives for the word 'God,' which are found in South Arabian inscriptions—such as 'Father,' 'Uncle,' 'Protection,' 'Help,' (cf. the analogous use of *Tsur*='rock' in the

Old Testament), and especially the substitute 'His name,' which occurs so frequently—are merely so many witnesses to the lofty conception of the Deity entertained by the earliest Arabs. Compared with that held by the Babylonians, it can only be described as a very advanced type of Monotheism not unworthy to rank with the religion of the patriarch Abraham as presented in the Biblical narrative. If we look at the part played by the sublime and holy 'name of Yahveh' in the Old Testament Scriptures dealing with Mosaic times, we find that a growing reluctance to pronounce this sacred name led to its being replaced by the designation *shem*—'Name ( *κατ'ἑξοχὴν* ).' The fact, moreover, that the worship of a number of deities is prominently mentioned, even in the earliest South Arabian inscriptions, merely serves to throw into still stronger relief the persistent monotheism of the personal names, which even the lapse of a thousand years or so had been powerless to efface. How deeply this monotheistic principle must have rooted itself in the hearts of this people from the earliest ages is proved by its having been able, in face of the growing encroachments of polytheism, to retain for so long an undisputed position in their appellations."

It can not be denied that Professor Hommel's



remarks are interesting; it is, all the same, impossible to accept them as a final and decisive argument. Much as we are convinced that the peoples and nations inhabiting the Area of Friction between the great inland Empires about the middle of the second millennium B. C. were not so illiterate and heathenish as "Higher Criticism" has attempted to make them out, we can not admit that Professor Hommel's arguments from their nomenclature are a clinching proof of their exalted ideas about the Godhead. The examples he quotes, the names he adduces, look indeed *as if* those peoples had had a strongly monotheistic view of the Divinity. But being based, as it is, on purely philological reasoning, it can not be considered as definitive. Languages, as was said above, are very curious and eccentric manifestations of the human mind. The early Arabian manner of names *may* be proof conclusive of ethical monotheism; it may not. Nations express some of their deepest convictions in definite words and phrases; others they do not express explicitly at all. The English, whose law is mostly what the Romans call *jus*, and the Germans call *Recht*, have no term whatever for either *jus* (droit) or *Recht*. We can not, in ordinary fairness, conclude anything positive from the arguments proffered by Pro-

fessor Hommel. A philological argument must be complemented by a psychological reason in order to be really conclusive. This Professor Hommel has not done. In all his works there is not a trace of psychological argument. He is in this respect quite on all-fours with the Higher Critics. Had he shown some psychological reason that compels us to credit his early Arabs with an exalted belief in ethical Monotheism, then, and then alone, his philological arguments would have carried great force. Without such psychological reasons his arguments are only in the nature of mere preliminary remarks. They can not prove very much. Bishop Welldon, in a vigorous and weighty speech he made as chairman at one of the lectures of the author, accused the *Encyclopædia Biblica* of a deliberate attempt to undermine the religious contents of the Bible. The learned bishop was quite right. From the technical point of view it may be added, that in all the bulky volumes of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* there is not a trace of those forces that have in all times prompted and activated man: psychological forces. There are scholastic arguments upon arguments; quotations upon quotations; facts and *demi-facts* in their thousands. But there is no psychological motive, no psychological force. Take, for instance, the example of Abraham.

For the vast majority of the Higher Critics, Abraham is a myth. Dozy, rather unkindly, but with a distinct gift for mineralogy, turned Abraham into a fetish-stone.<sup>9</sup> The redoubtable Hungarian critic, Professor Goldzieher, identifies Abraham with the starred heavens, and so at least gives him a position of dignity.<sup>10</sup> The well-known historian Stade, who enriched one of the works of syndicated History, published in Germany, Oncken's series, with a "History of Israel," makes of Abraham, not only a *heros eponymos*, but also a locality, a place where religious cults were practiced.<sup>11</sup> Abraham, it will be seen, was thus a multifarious being both on earth and in the heavens. We have seen above how Genesis xiv, treating of Abraham, has been reduced to a simple forgery by the ingenuity of the Higher Critics.

Had psychological reasoning been applied to the story of Abraham as recorded in Genesis xi and the subsequent chapters, most of the arguments adduced against the historical existence of the Patriarch would have fallen to the ground at once. In every authentic historical record

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<sup>9</sup>Dozy, *De Israeliten te Mekka*, 1864, pp. 21 *seq.*

<sup>10</sup>Goldzieher, *Der Mythos bei den Hebraeern*, 1876, pp. 109 *seq.*

<sup>11</sup>Stade, *Geschichte Israels*, pp. 127 *seq.*

there are slender but unmistakable symptoms of its truth, which the forger does not think of, and which impress him who knows something about the psychology of history, as irrefragable evidence of authenticity. Just as in music the master does not show so much in the beauty of the leading melodies, in that many a dilettant may eventually strike out a very beautiful theme, but rather in the side-issues of accompaniment, elaboration, and ornamentation; even so in historical records, side-issues frequently reveal an authenticity which the main themes do not fully establish. It is so with the Biblical narratives about Abraham. The Higher Critics have never laid much stress, in fact, no stress whatever, on Genesis xi, 31, and xii, 1, *seq.*, in which it is pointed out that Abraham was a foreigner, a man who had left his original domicile at Ur in Chaldæa, in order to repair to Canaan. In this one trait, so completely neglected by the Higher Critics, there is more solid evidence for the historic existence of the Patriarch than there is in all the Higher Critics' philological arguments to the contrary. A mere forger would never have thought of making Abraham a foreigner. He would have made him a king, a prince, a great personage of the very country whose *heros eponymos* he was

made to be. The idea of making him a simple foreigner could never have occurred to a forger. A forger who concocts historical documents does so to please some powerful caste, or rank, or person. In neither of these cases can he possibly have much motive to make the Founder of the nation a simple foreigner. He will make him a god, or the offspring of a god; but never a mere foreigner. In early times, as well as to-day, foreigners were a matter of pity or contempt. In reality, they are one of the great forces of history. This, however, does not alter the opinion that people form about them. Even in the United States there arose, from the hatred of the foreigner, the party of the so-called "Know-nothings;" and yet all Americans are practically foreigners, or the sons or grandsons of foreigners. If, therefore, Abraham has been made by "*concoction*," "*contamination*," "*genealogical tree-making*," or by any other process of pure invention, then the above passages in Genesis xi and xii are inexplicable.

If, on the other hand, Abraham is taken as an historic personage; if it is assumed that he had an historic existence,—then the passages in the eleventh and twelfth chapters of Genesis shed a flood of light on the history of Abraham and his time. As the author remarked many

years ago, the history of the foreigner has never been written up.<sup>12</sup> If we consider all the stim-

<sup>12</sup>The *foreigner*, whether he arrives in compact masses or individually, is one of the richest types of history. As a rule, his very status as a foreigner quickens his energy, his wits, and endows him with a certain superiority over the native population, from whose national weaknesses he is often free. Some of the main streams of history have been largely formed by rich affluents of foreigners; and secondary nations have invariably been such as remained unmolested, but also unfertilized, by the immigration of numerous foreigners.

“No wiser word ever fell from the lips of John Selden than the remark that they who want to rule people make themselves as different from them as possible. The stranger, by the very isolation in which he stands to the people around him, acquires a superiority over them. Their foibles are not his; and therefore where they are weak he is strong. Their virtues are not his; and therefore where they recoil he will boldly push onward. Their perils are not his; and therefore where they succumb he will survive. But chief of all, where they are agitated by passion and blinded by violent desires, he is cool and collected. In all history, strangers have exercised an enormous influence. As so many other chapters of general history, this, too, has not yet been written. There is no general history of strangers or foreigners. Yet if we pause to think, in English history, of the vast influence of foreigners, from William the Conqueror, Simon de Montfort, and William the Third, to Disraeli; or in French history, from Alcuin of York and Scotus Erigena to Mazarin and Napoleon; in Austrian history, from Rudolf of Hapsburg (in Switzerland) to Prince Eugene of Savoy, Van Swieten, Count Beust, a Saxon, and Count Andrassy, a Hungarian; in Russia, from the first Ruriks from Sweden to Catherine the

Great, a German princess,—we can not but acknowledge that strangers have contributed to the formation of States and their history very much more than the patriotism or vanity of nations is ready to admit.”<sup>1</sup>

In a book of singular interest on the influence of strangers on the economic history of England, Professor W. Cunningham has arrived at the following conclusion: “It is clear that for the whole of our textile manufactures, for our shipping, for numberless improvements in mining, in the hardware trades and in agriculture, and for everything connected with the organization of business, we are deeply indebted to the alien immigrants. Their influence on other sides of life is less easy to assess and trace; but it is none the less real. It may suffice to say that, all through the Middle Ages, our isolated country was behind the rest of Europe in many ways, and that it has been through the agency of immigrants that we have been brought into contact with higher civilizations, and thus been enabled to learn from them.”<sup>2</sup>

The influence of the foreigner in France has been no less remarkable. Even to-day France has, of all European countries of considerable size, the largest share of immigrants. In the year 1851 there were 379,289 aliens in France. This number rose, in 1891, to 1,130,211, the majority of whom were Belgians and Italians.<sup>3</sup> In Germany, on the other hand, the number of aliens in 1890 was only 433,254. In the Middle Ages the Franks, the Normans, the English, and a vast number of merchants immigrated uninterruptedly into the east, northwest, southwest of France, and into the districts of the famous Champagne fairs (at Provins, Troyes, Bar-sur-Aube, etc.), respectively. The Italians, or rather Lombards and Florentines, kept up a

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<sup>1</sup> From an article of the author in the *Nineteenth Century* for September, 1896.

<sup>2</sup> “Allen Immigrants to England,” 1897, p. 263.

<sup>3</sup> Turquan, Victor, *Le dénombrement des étrangers en France* (in *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, November, 1904.)

constant current of immigrants. It is no haphazard that the three greatest orders of the early Middle Ages were all founded in France, but by foreigners. St. Bruno of Cologne founded the Carthusians; St. Stephen Harding of Sherborne, in Dorsetshire, was the real founder of the Cistercians; and St. Norbert, of Xanten, in Westphalia, founded the Premonstratensians. The United States, where most people are "foreigners" settled for one or two generations, is the classical type of what the energies of newcomers can do, in a country which from its immunity from invasion would otherwise be doomed to stagnation; and when the Scotch by the Union with England became "foreigners," settled in England, they quickly developed the marvelous resources of subtle and tenacious energy which have immeasurably extended their formerly poor spheres of activity. The Portuguese, who ought to be the Scotch of Spain, finally severed their connection with Spain in 1640, and thus also with success. The orthodox Jews are another historic example of the powers of "foreigners;" and in the Jesuits (artificial Jews, as it were) that power has reached its most consummate organization. Nor must it be forgotten that the influx of the provincial into the towns, by giving the country people, through their new status as "foreigners," new energies of the freshest vigor, has at all times infused new life into the history of a nation. All the leading men of the French Revolution were provincials; the two greatest minds of the English, Shakespeare and Newton, were provincials; with one or two exceptions, all the great writers of the Romans were provincials.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>On the great effects of the migration of the country people into the towns, the most suggestive book is Georg Hansen, *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen* (Munich, 1889, pp. 407); see also the literature of the question in Georg von Mayer's *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre* (1897), II, pp. 124-125.

The literature of the "foreigner" is both numerous and difficult to reach. In addition to the State documents, statutes, and law cases of each country, to the "proceedings"



ulating and energizing power inherent in foreigners, we can not for a moment doubt that the Bible, in making the great Patriarch a foreigner, has related one of the broad facts of history. His greatness closely corresponds to the psychological status, internal and external, of a foreigner. Had he not been a foreigner, we might and should have accepted him on the strength of our faith. Having been a foreigner, as the Holy Book states, we must accept him as an historic personage on the strength of true insight into the real forces of history. In that one trait of Abraham being a foreigner in the land where his seed was to establish a polity—in many respects the most important of all polities

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of the various "Huguenot" societies, and the publications of Waldenses, Moravian Brethren, Knights Templars, and similar sects and orders, there are many essays and monographs scattered over the whole of Europe, more especially about the Italians, who for several centuries (from the eleventh to the sixteenth) were the *foreigners* par excellence in all the western countries. Their merchants, doctors, teachers, literati, and ecclesiastical agents formed permanent currents of immigrants, very many of whom remained in foreign parts. The student will find ample bibliographies on the peaceful invasion of European countries by foreigners in Professor W. Cunningham's "Alien Immigrants to England" (1897); in L. Goldschmidt's *Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts* (1891), pp. 180-237; in von Fircks' *Bevölkerungslehre* (1898), pp. 470-474; in Georg von Mayer's *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre* (1897), pp. 115-128; in Otto Bremer's *Ethnographie der Germanischen Stämme* (1900), *passim*; and also in Ulysse Chevallier's *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen âge*, second division (*Τόπο-Bibliographic*), under the names of the various countries, sections; *relations* and *détails*. Nor should the *Anleitung zur deutschen Landes- und Volksforschung*, edited by Alfred Kirchoff (1882), be neglected.

—in that one trait, we say, the full authenticity of the Biblical story of Abraham is manifested to him who can really read history. As Professor Sayce has well pointed out, the native peoples of Canaan never showed much superior energy in either averting the attacks of the great inland Empires of the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Babylonians, the Egyptians, etc., or in working out their own civilization.<sup>13</sup> Professor Sayce arrives at this statement by a laborious study of the new readings of the Tell-el-Amarna tablets. There is a shorter way for him who has given adequate thought to the study of the principles of history. What happened in Palestine was only the very thing that happened everywhere else where great history was made. In all highly civilized countries the initiative forces were largely represented by newcomers, by foreigners. Had William the Conqueror, or some other Frenchman, Dane, or Norwegian not conquered England, England's would have been the fate of Ireland. The fierce energy of a foreigner alone could have founded the English Empire in the Middle Ages; and by an Empire alone was England placed in a position to avoid

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<sup>13</sup> See a remarkable article of Prof. Sayce in *The Contemporary Review* for August, 1905, on "Canaan in the Century before the Exodus."

sharing the fate of all the other great islands of Europe, such as Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Ireland. These islands were in all history invariably absorbed by some Continental Power with resources greater than islands, unless they found Empires, can ever hope to wield.<sup>14</sup> The feat of William the Conqueror, then, is the keynote of English and British history. If, now, some "Higher Critic" should try to make out that William the Conqueror was a pure Anglo-Saxon, that critic would thereby commit the same unpardonable sin against the true spirit of history as do those Higher Critics that neglect Genesis xi, 31; xii, 1, *seq.*, and undertake to make of Abraham a mere myth. We said above (chapter ii) that the existence of Abraham can not be proved in the same way as can the existence of Moses. The existence of Moses can be proved in a manner that amounts to a psychological necessity. The existence of Abraham can not as yet be proved, from the plane of history alone, with arguments amounting to a psychological necessity. It can, however, be proved to be a matter of the greatest historic probability; and since there is no valid, or even serious, argument

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<sup>14</sup> See the author's "Imperialism," 1905.

against the belief in Abraham's historic existence, such a very great historic probability easily blends with a final and certain belief in the reality of the Patriarch.

Here is the juncture where we must again reconsider that much-abused term, Myth. Ever since the times of Dupuis's (Charles François) *Origine de tous les cultes* (4 vols., 4°, 1795), it has become more and more the custom and "method" of philological historians to dissolve historical persons or events into "myths." Abraham, of course, is a myth; so is, as we have seen in the first chapter, Joseph, Moses, David; and so will, no doubt, soon be Jesus,—astral myths; that is, solar, lunar, zodiacal, milky-way myths. After what was said in the previous chapter on the methods of the judges in witch-trials, can the the gentle reader entertain any longer a doubt about the true origin of all this myth theory? Did not those judges commit all their atrocities with the identical method of creating arbitrarily a myth, the myth of the witch? The myth of witches' orgies with the Evil One; of their dancing on the Blocksberg; of their descending through chimneys with the well-known uncanny sounds of the wind; of their making an unguent of the fat of unbap-

tized children whom they had murdered,<sup>15</sup> etc., etc.? The inquisitorial method, apparently so severely "scientific," is necessarily bound to indulge in constant myth-making. It is part of its nature. It has no other basis to work from. As the seventeenth century judges created or perfected the witch myth, even so the Higher Critics created the astral myth. Once you assume the reality of witches and their witchcraft, you have, without any further trouble, the amplest material to work with, even if the concrete case should be as meager and flimsy as possible. We have seen that the judge in the seventeenth century could easily "make a case" of any person ever so lightly or frivolously accused of witchery. Nay, the less real basis or evidence he had, the bigger a "case" he could make of it. It is precisely so with the modern judges of the witch-trial of the Bible. The less real evidence they have, the more comfortably they proceed. Their basis is there; they have it before any sifting of evidence. Their basis

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<sup>15</sup> In Janssen's *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes* (*History of the German People*), of which there is an English translation, vol. viii (1894), there is a very full and instructive chapter on the myths of witchcraft. See also Hansen, Jos., *Quellen . . . zur Geschichte des Hexenwahns* (Bonn, 1901, 703 pp.)

is their assumption of an astral myth. Once you admit that, nobody can resist you. In that irrepressible autocar of your own invention you dash through all the jungles and woods of history, crushing all before you, killing men, women, and children on the road. Who, indeed, can hope to escape it?<sup>16</sup>

It is, however, not sufficient to show, negatively, the worthlessness of the conception of myths generally held by philological historians and theologians. We must now point out the positive and constructive side of myths. It is imperatively necessary for every serious student of the Bible to have a clear idea of the nature of the great myths of nations. For there are indeed myths; there are even astral myths. But not every myth is a great myth; nor is every

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<sup>16</sup> In a letter to *The Record*, London, the Rev. W. S. Lach-Szyrma makes the following bright and profound remarks: "Let us apply this method (of astral myth-making) to known and established modern facts, *e. g.*: 1. Archbishop Whately proved, in his 'Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bonaparte,' that Napoleon (a contemporary of the archbishop) was merely a sun-myth. . . . 2. In *Macmillan's Magazine* it has been proved in the brilliant article on the 'Great Gladstone Myth,' that Mr. Gladstone was a myth of the sun, and Mr. Chamberlain a myth of a cloud. . . . By higher critical methods they have been proved myths. 3. M. Henri Gaidoz, of Paris, has proved in his article, *Que M. Max Müller n'a jamais existé* ('that Mr. M.

great myth an astral myth. He who wants to fortify himself against the insidious arguments of Higher Critics will do best by trying to form a distinct and adequate idea of how the great myths of nations arise. And in this respect he can not do better than throw overboard all the current notions about the origin of myths as taught by the philological historians and most of the folklorists. If one were to believe the "mythologists", from Creuzer to Gruppe, myths arose in ancient times as a sort of day-dreaming practiced by idling bards. Some individuals, the mythologists imagine, who had nothing else to do, lay down basking in the lovely sun of Delos or Crete, and, giving free play to their fancy, invented the myths of the Amazons, of the daughters of Danaos, of Hercules, of The-

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Müller has never existed'), by M. Müller's own canons of philological criticism, that he was a mere sun-myth, and his house in the Parks, Oxford, as mythical as the fairy palace in 'Beauty and the Beast.' Nay, more, I am perfectly prepared to give strong evidence on higher critical grounds that Dr. Driver himself is a myth, and not a real person. The history of the Victorian Age in England is full of accidental coincidences such as a Higher Critic in the future might use to cast doubts on facts—*e. g.*, the three Roman Catholic cardinals at this period were Wiseman (the prudent founder of the Roman aggression); Newman, the new convert; Manning, who 'manned' his sect with so many followers." (*The Record*, London, July 28, 1905.)

seus and Ariadne. Any small phenomenon of the soil, or the hills and rivulets of their country in Argos or Bœotia was, it is held, sufficient reason or stimulant to give rise to a great myth. Thus, the significant myth of Danaos was "suggested" by the insignificant torrent Inachos (now Panitsa) in Argolis. The wonderful myth of the Amazons "probably" arose from retrospective "construction" of some Athenian cults, etc.

The mythologists forget, as usual, the most elementary considerations of psychology. Myth-making is no mere day-dreaming; otherwise the laziest people, such as those of Naples or Seville ought to have endowed us with the most charming and significant myths. As a matter of fact, great myths invariably come from great, that is exceedingly energetic and active people. Great myths are for the second millennium B. C. what great literature was for the fifth century B. C. in Hellas. Unless a nation's imagination is stirred to its very base by actions of vital importance, that nation will have neither the force nor the desire of creating great myths. It need scarcely be added that great myths are such as contain not only an interesting story, but more especially some remarkable philosophic, artistic, or religious principle, some



rich spiritual possibility of thought. The myth, for instance, of the Amazons, whatever else it may, and does, indicate in point of history, is, quite independently of its historical meaning, an invaluable expression of an abiding type of womanhood through all ages. The myth of the daughters of Danaos similarly expresses an abiding phenomenon in nature; her supremacy over man as shown by the alternate abundance and drought of the soil. Myths of that kind are, like great literature in later periods, the reflex of immense national aspirations and struggles. Without Philip Second's Armada there would have been no Shakespeare. The glorious and gigantic effort of Elizabethan England to beat back the then greatest Power in Europe and America, so intensified the whole mental organization of the English that, focusing themselves, as it were, in Shakespeare, they produced *Hamlet*, and *King Lear*, and *Richard III*. Without England's mighty fight in the times of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713)—when England herself was, as it were, alone in her little island trying to build her a bigger hut, the British Empire—no Defoe could ever have written the greatest book for boys, "Robinson Crusoe." Defoe's book incarnates a type, an abiding type of youthful man-

hood and self-reliance, and was accordingly born out of England's own "Robinsonade." Or did the myth of "The Wandering Jew," or that of "The Flying Dutchman," arise out of mere contemplation of pictures, or mere day-dreaming?

Great myths, then, whether astral or no, arise only out of great and lasting struggles of high-strung nations. Where there are no such struggles; where all the forces of a nation are not being drawn upon constantly and under great stress of danger or hope, there the imagination of the nation remains frigid and stale. It is quite true that most nations have stories and myths about things in heaven and on earth, and that there are, in outward form, very remarkable similarities and coincidences between the myths,—for instance, of the Greeks and those of other nations.<sup>17</sup> The marble is more or less the same; but the Athenians alone had the Parthenon. In Greek myths alone there are, as a rule, those fruitful germs of thought artistic, philosophic, and religious that render them ever-

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<sup>17</sup> Compare, for instance, Hartland, E. S., "Legend of Perseus" (3 vol. 1894-1896); Mannhardt's works on Greek Cults; Girard de Rialle, *Mythologie Comparée* (1878), Meyer, Elard H., *Indogermanische Mythen* (1883-87); v. D. Gehyn, *Essais de mythologie comparée* (1885); J. G. Frazer's inexhaustible "Golden Bough" and "Pausanias."

interesting and ever-instructive. They reflect as much light as their makers absorbed in their upward struggle for the sunny heights of Freedom, and Beauty, and Power.

If we now apply these principles to the Biblical story of Abraham, we can not but gain a new reason for bowing to the honesty and authenticity of the Holy Book. It is related in Genesis that Abraham had indeed an exalted idea of the Godhead; that he was, in a measure, the ancestor and founder of the Israelites; that he, too, had some little warring and fighting; but that, on the whole, his was a life of patriarchal quietude and composure. In perfect harmony with that beautifully even life, not the faintest attempt at mythifying Abraham is made. He is represented as a prudent, practical man, who was distinctly aware of the preliminary, if necessary, character of his vocation. No vast and abiding principle of philosophy, art, or politics is meant to be represented by him. In point of religion, indeed, he is the representative of a great principle in its initial stage; but in every other respect he is only representative of a godly and well-meaning patriarch. Such a good person can not be mythified by a nation like the Israelites, who, subsequently to Abraham, went through the most Titanic struggles a

nation has ever gone through. A patriarch like Abraham does not kindle the mythological imagination of a nation like the Israelites. They may have done so (*in theory* this much may be admitted) with a man like Samson or David; it has still to be proved that they *have* done so. But with Abraham they could not have done it. This is psychologically in the highest degree improbable; and unless the most unequivocal and conclusive proof is adduced to the contrary, the *astralization* of Abraham can not be admitted as a subject of serious discussion.

We have thus seen, from more than one standpoint, that the story of Abraham as given in Genesis is, when read in the light of ordinary historic psychology, one of complete credibility. It puts to shame all the attempts of the "Higher Critics" to strike it out as a forgery, or as an astral myth. It stands where it stood before; and at the threshold of our religious history we are still happy to greet the venerable patriarch who was privileged by the Lord to be the first of those great Personalities through whom His Word was to reach mankind. We shall see, in the next chapter, that the trend of Hebrew history confirms at its furthest end what the Bible tells us happened at its outset. Abraham stands to the beginning of Hebrew history exactly in

the same relation in which the Judges, Kings, and Prophets stand to its middle, and Jesus and the apostles to its termination. It is all of a piece. It is like the world itself. The world was not made by a specialist, but by an Universalist who impressed upon it His Thought and Will: One Infinite Idea.



CHAPTER V.

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PROPHETS AND FROM  
THE THEORY OF PERSONALITY.





## CHAPTER V.

### THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PROPHETS AND FROM THE THEORY OF PERSONALITY.

IN the four preceding chapters we have approached the question of the failure of Higher Criticism from four different standpoints; we are now proceeding to a fifth point of view, a fifth plane from which we mean to lead the reader to the conviction that "Higher Criticism" is one of the worst of scientific failures recorded in the annals of research.

This time we shall start from the eighth century B. C., and work backwards. We shall do what has always appeared to serious students and thinkers one of the safest ways of ensuring solid results. We start from the eighth century B. C., because from that century we have prophetic writings which very few even of the Higher Critics have seriously declared to be inauthentic. We mean, in the first place, the writings of Amos and Hosea. It is true that

Amos has not quite escaped the inquisitorial insinuations and doubts of the Higher Critics. How could he, or, for the matter of that, any one else? We saw that the inquisitorial method of the Higher Critics allows them to cast doubts on anything, and on any one; to prove or to disprove anything they like; to accept or to condemn just as they fancy it. Far from being astounded at having fought shy, to a certain extent, of the Prophets, we must rather expect them to declare, *in corpore*, what at present is said by a few of them, such as E. Havet, M. Vernes, and others; namely, that "the Prophetic Books, far from having that high antiquity which is attributed to them, were not written before the second century B. C."<sup>1</sup> In fact, the lenience and patience of the Higher Critics with regard to the Prophets is inconceivable. Having victoriously reduced Abraham, Moses, Joshua, Samson, and David to nice little astral myths, how can they tarry so long over mere Prophets; that is, men mostly of lowly origin, with no official character, no particular social status, nor men of independent means. The

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<sup>1</sup>Havet, E., *La modernité des Prophètes* (1891) p. 7: " . . . que les livres prophétiques, loin d'avoir la haute antiquité qu'on leur attribuait, n'avaient été écrits qu'à la fin du II<sup>e</sup> siècle avant notre ère."

Higher Critics, down to Wellhausen, do, it is true, their best to apply to the Prophets as many pinpricks as possible. They deny the authenticity of Amos ii, 4, 5—just 4, 5;<sup>2</sup> then also iv, 13; v, 8; ix, 5;<sup>3</sup> etc. But is this petty warfare really worthy of men so grand and redoubtable? Smaller enemies than the Prophets have long exclaimed, “Sword-cuts, if you please, but no pinpricks!” Would it not be more charitable to use against the Prophets the full armory of the torture, the full impact of the scientific instruments so carefully determined by the judges in witch-trials of the seventeenth century? Would it not be more in keeping with the strict scientific method of Higher Criticism to say to the Prophets: “Gentlemen, we regret, but your pretense of having lived in the eighth or the seventh century B. C., and of having written certain Prophetic writings, is really quite unacceptable. In the first place, you are fully aware of the fact that you never lived at all, and that your hypothetical existence at present you owe simply to our need of proving that you too are astral myths. Yours is what our teachers would

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<sup>2</sup>Duhm, *Theologie der Propheten* (1875), p. 119; likewise Stade, *Geschichte Israels*, p. 571; also Oort, a Dutch Higher Critic; and Cornill, the musical Higher Critic; *apud König, Einleitung*, p. 303.

<sup>3</sup>König, l. c.

have called a sub-potential existence for the sake of argument. True, some people refer to numerous pieces of evidence coming from Assyrian, and other independent sources, confirming many a detail in your writings. But is it not evident in your case, as it was in the case of Abraham, that the more local color one can show to exist in your pretended writings, the more certain it becomes that, as our colleague Vernes profoundly said,<sup>4</sup> your local color was probably superimposed by a late and latest interpolator? *Quien sabe?* as our friends, the sagacious Spaniards, say. Interpolators are *so* wily. But we are more than a match for such wiles. The more subtle the wiles, the more subtle the meshes in which we capture them. The idea of Prophets and Prophetic writings, we admit, is not quite bad. It suits the agitated times of the eighth century B. C. to perfection. It is just what one might expect in times of great tribulation, and we are not unwilling to credit the interpolator with a large measure of historic *finesse*. He clearly thought that when the Athenians in times of need solicited the help of Solon—provided they ever did do so, which we must leave to the judgment of our philological colleagues; or if the Florentines implored the help

<sup>4</sup>Vernes, *Précis d'histoire juive* (1889), p. 805.

of Savonarola, and the Genevans that of Calvin,—then the Hebrews of the eighth century B. C. may also have desired and needed some such help from what in their ignorance they called Prophets. But, as already remarked, the very *finesse* of the interpolator betrays him. So nice a harmony between what is and what is expected to be, is in the highest degree suspicious. Gentlemen, we regret to say that clever interpolators have given you an utterly false impression of your existence.”

The preceding oration of the Higher Critics, although not directly quotable from their writings is, as every student of the matter knows, a true *résumé* of the drift of their endless arguments about the Prophetic writings. The method they use must inevitably lead them to a rejection of the most probable events and persons; and it is no serious exaggeration to say that Higher Critics, after successfully exterminating the great personalities of history, must, out of sheer lack of persons to be dissolved in air, attack and destroy, without necessarily astralizing one another. Romulus killed Remus; Professor Niebuhr killed Romulus; Professors Gerlach and Bachofen killed Professor Niebuhr; and so *in infinitum*.

This preposterous method must, and we con-

fidently trust will, come to its overdue end. It must, at any rate, be made clear to the millions of honest people who want to use their Bible as their strongest and most comforting consolation for life and after-life, that all the arguments of the Higher Critics have so far not been able to move a stone from the edifice inside which over a hundred generations have sought and found their spiritual bliss. In the present chapter we want to show that Amos and Hosea alone, although by far not the greatest of the Prophets, are irrefragable evidence of the authenticity of the Pentateuch. We want to show that he who admits that Amos and Hosea said, by about the middle of the eighth century B. C., what in their writings they are reported to have said and written,—he, we say, who accepts Amos and Hosea, has thereby fully accepted the Pentateuch. It is well known that Cuvier, the great naturalist, used to declare, “Give me one tooth of an animal, and I will reconstruct the whole animal.” With even greater force the historian, let alone the theologian, may say, “Give me Amos and Hosea, and I will psychologically compel you to admit the authenticity of the Pentateuch.”

There are two great and broad facts pervading the writings of Amos and Hosea. One is

their firm and fervent belief in ethical Monotheism; the other is their firm belief in the Egyptian slavery of the Israelites and in the Exodus. It is these two facts from which, as from a safe leaping-board, we may venture to throw ourselves into the "darkness" of the centuries before Amos. We again, and purposely, disregard here merely religious or doctrinal considerations. We are nothing but dry historians.

It will be necessary to premise the requisite passages from Amos and Hosea:

Amos (first half of the eighth century B. C.)

Chapter ii, verse 10:

"Also I brought you up from the land of Egypt, and led you forty years through the wilderness, to possess the land of the Amorite."

Chapter iii, verse 1:

"Hear this word that the Lord hath spoken against you, O children of Israel, against the whole family which I brought up from the land of Egypt saying."

Chapter iii, verse 7:

"Surely the Lord God will do nothing, but He revealeth His secret unto His servants the prophets."

Chapter iv, verse 11:

"I have overthrown some of you, as God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, and ye were as a

firebrand plucked out of the burning: yet have ye not returned unto Me, saith the Lord."

Chapter iv, verses 12 and 13:

"Therefore thus will I do unto thee, O Israel: and because I will do this unto thee, prepare to meet thy God, O Israel.

"For, lo, He that formeth the mountains, and createth the wind, and declareth unto man what in His thought, that maketh the morning darkness and treadeth upon the high places of the earth, the Lord, the God of hosts, is His name."

Chapter ix, verse 5:

"And the Lord God of hosts is He that toucheth the land, and it shall melt, and all that dwell therein shall mourn: and it shall rise up wholly like a flood; and shall be drowned, as by the flood of Egypt."

Hosea (middle of eighth century B. C.)  
Chapter i, verses 9 and 10:

"Then said God, Ye are not My people, and I will not be your God.

"Yet the number of the children of Israel shall be as the sand of the sea, which can not be measured nor numbered; and it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said unto them, Ye are not My people, there it shall be said unto them, Ye are the sons of the living God."



Chapter ii, verses 19, 21, 23 :

“And I will betroth thee unto me for ever ;  
yea, I will betroth thee unto me in righteousness,  
and in judgment, and in loving kindness, and in  
mercies.”

“And it shall come to pass in that day, I will  
hear, saith the Lord, I will hear the heavens,  
and they shall hear the earth.”

“ . . . I will say to them which were not  
My people, Thou art My people ; and they shall  
say, Thou art my God.”

Chapter iii, verse 5 :

“Afterwards shall the children of Israel re-  
turn, and seek the Lord their God. . . .”

Chapter iv, verse 1 :

“Hear the word of the Lord, ye children of  
Israel: for the Lord hath a controversy with  
the inhabitants of the land, because there is no  
truth, nor mercy, nor knowledge of God in the  
land.”

Chapter ii, verse 15 :

“And I will give her her vineyards from  
thence, and the valley of Achor for a door of  
hope: and she shall sing there, as in the days of  
her youth, and as in the day when she came up  
out of the land of Egypt.”

Chapter viii, verses 13 and 14 :

“ . . . But the Lord accepteth them not ;

now will he remember their iniquity, and visit their sins: they shall return to Egypt.

“For Israel hath forgotten his Maker, and buildeth temples. . . .”

Chapter xi, verse 1:

“When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called My son out of Egypt.”

Chapter xi, verse 9:

“. . . For I am God, and not man; the Holy One in the midst of thee. . . .”

Chapter xii, verse 9:

“And I that am the Lord thy God from the land of Egypt will yet make thee to dwell in tabernacles. . . .”

Chapter xii, verses 12 and 13:

“And Jacob fled into the country of Syria, and Israel served for a wife, and for a wife he kept sheep.

“And by a prophet the Lord brought Israel out of Egypt, and by a prophet was he preserved.”

Chapter xiii, verses 4 and 5:

“Yet I am the Lord thy God from the land of Egypt, and thou shalt know no god but Me: for there is no Savior beside Me.

“I did know thee in the wilderness, in the land of great drought.”

Chapter xiii, verse 14:

“I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death. . . .”

It is impossible to deny that the preceding passages contain a clear, firm, and fervent belief in ethical Monotheism. Nor has that ever been doubted. A number of Higher Critics have, as we have seen, opined that this verse or the other in Amos might be an interpolation; and a few “Highest” Critics have relegated Amos, together with all the other Prophets, or rather Prophetic writings, to the second century B. C. We may therefore truly contend that the general trend of theologians and historians is still in favor of the statement that the above passages from Amos and Hosea were actually written in the eighth century B. C.

This is all that is needed for our purpose. If the preceding passages may be, and are, taken as having been made in the eighth century B. C., then it is implicitly and explicitly proved that in the kingdoms of Israel and Judah there was, as early as the eighth century B. C., a clear and full belief in ethical Monotheism.

This much the rankest Higher Critic would not hesitate to admit. He does so, because inwardly he thinks that, in admitting that, he has

admitted very little. Again, applying his favorite category of the Possible he says: "In admitting that, in the first half of the eighth century B. C., there were, in the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, men who had a fair conception of ethical Monotheism, I have by no means attributed to the then Hebrews any spiritual superiority at all. They had, or some of them had, a good notion of ethical Monotheism; but could they not possibly have derived it from the infinitely higher civilized Babylonians or Egyptians? Might it not have been a mere copy of archaic, or, at any rate, previous notions taught by the Babylonians? There was, for centuries before Amos, a very lively intercourse of commerce and traffic between Palestine on the one hand, and Egypt and Babylon on the other. With the merchant and trader came also, no doubt, a little literature. The merchant who sold his earthenware, his fine clothes, or jewelry, might he not also sell a 'book' or two? Might not in one of those clay tablets have been more than one suggestion of a belief in Monotheism of which we have numerous traces in Babylonian and Egyptian literature? In selling his material goods, might not the clever Babylonian trader have sold also a little Monotheism too? There is no inherent impossibility in this. In

fact, do not ideas spread in that way? Is there not a silent migration of ideas, as, alas! there is one of microbes? Such germs and ideas might very well have fallen on congenial ground. The Hebrews were rather clever people; they have at all times had a marked genius for assimilation both of things and of ideas. They assimilated the Babylonian or Egyptian ideas *re* Monotheism, and, finding them effective, they advertised them with a vengeance. While, therefore, we can not deny that there is indeed a belief in ethical Monotheism in Amos and Hosea, we do not in the least mean to admit that this redounds to the spiritual glory of the Hebrews. They were, not long before the eighth century B. C., still on the religious level of their neighbors—that is, mere idolators—and therefore Amos and Hosea do not prove that their ethical Monotheism was a distinctive feature of the Hebrew nation at all. Least of all does it prove the Exodus and Moses.”

It were idle to fill the margins of this little book with quotations from the works of the “Higher Critics” in which the preceding pseudo-arguments have been advanced, as a whole or in parts. No one can have read those works without being aware that the ground-base of their reasoning consists of the assumption that the

Monotheism of the ancient Hebrews was a thing borrowed, given, or "transmitted" to them from other and more civilized nations. The psychological reason of this assumption is to be found in modern Antisemitism. An age, as ours, that has been so deeply agitated by the aspersions and aggressions of "Antisemites," more particularly in Germany and France, can not psychologically persuade itself that a sublime perennial idea, such as pure Monotheism, is derived from a people now so much looked down upon. On the contrary, all its anti-Semitic instincts lead it to believe that the forefathers of the modern Jews were just as low and contemptible a people as are, from the anti-Semitic standpoint, the modern Hebrews. And since no one amongst the German or French anti-Semites so much as doubts the reality of "race;" and since they take it for granted that the modern Jews (the most mixed people, genealogically speaking, of all) are still the unadulterated descendants of the ancient Hebrews,—the anti-Semites can not and will not admit that the greatest spiritual force of all ages was introduced by Jews. In discarding the belief of the Hebrew origin of ethical Monotheism, Higher Critics are thus the victims both of a thoroughly vitiated method, as shown before, and of one of the strongest social prejudices of modern times.

It is here out of place to discuss anti-Semitism. The author has done that elsewhere. It is sufficient to have indicated its workings in the subterranean cavities of "Higher" Biblical Criticism. What we are bound to consider here with great care is the question whether such a thing as Hebrew Monotheism of the eighth century B. C., as revealed in Amos and Hosea, *can* be given, or borrowed, or transmitted.

To this, there is a simple and categoric answer: No; absolutely not. A national belief, such as ethical Monotheism, can neither be simply given to, nor taken by, a nation. It must grow out of that nation; it must be so welcome to other and vital institutions of that nation that, even if that nation should not have positively originated it, it must have met it half way. For ethical Monotheism is not one thing. The bookworm, indeed, readily imagines that Monotheism consists in the arithmetical statement that there is only one God, and not two gods, or two and a half. This statement of the Oneness of God is, however, not the be-all and end-all of Monotheism. It is its husk; not its essence. Monotheism, like all fundamental attitudes of the human mind, is a system of a great many mental, spiritual, and social correlations. It is a vast fabric of religious and ethical forces and attitudes. To have a firm and

powerful notion of, and belief in, Monotheism, a nation must have a national morality attuned to the ethics of the Monotheistic idea. He alone is a true Monotheist who feels in him, as a living force, the uncompromising belief that as the world is to the One Living God, so is his whole life to the One Living Ethical Force in him, beyond which there can be no real solace nor any real happiness. Monotheism is, as it were, twofold while being all one: first, cosmic Monotheism, or the relation of the One God to the world; and then, ethical Monotheism, or the relation of man's actions to the One Law of Morality. These two integral factors of Monotheism can not be severed, and it was for their extension to all humanity, and not only to a small nation, that the coming of the Savior was as necessary for all men as that of Moses had been for the Israelites.

Traders, agents, books may very well "give" to a nation the bald statement that there is only One God. But can they also give to that nation the whole mental and moral attitude without which the mere acceptance of the numerical oneness of the Godhead is void and stale? Can any single man, teacher, lecturer, preacher, trader, or agent give such an attitude to a nation? Has he ever done so? A rich man can found colleges and libraries; can he also give his nation



the gift of scientific thought? Managers can bring to their country all the great musicians, singers, pianists, conductors, violinists, and 'cellists in the world; can they give their nation the gift of music? Multi-millionaires can found and establish vast museums; can they give their nation the gift of art? Have they ever done so?

The most precious of our accomplishments, the greatest of our pleasures or treasures, are not matters of gift. They do not simply come to us. The average man, it is true, when he sees a great work of art, thinks he has learnt enough about it when he knows that it was made by the artist X., and given to the nation Y. It never occurs to the average man, that no single artist, as an individual, can be taken as the final and real cause of the art-work. No nation ever had a great artist unless the nation itself was great. When we contemplate a fair reconstruction of the Parthenon we ought, in the first place, not to think of Ictinus and Phidias, who directed the building of this most marvelous of all works of architecture. We ought to think of the Athenians, of the Greeks. We ought to say to ourselves, What a nation! What must they not have suffered; what mortal anguish, what terrible trials, and what magnificent triumphs must they not have gone through, be-

fore their hearts and minds were quickened into the maturity of insight, artistic power, and moderation that enabled them to make the Parthenon! Forsooth, it must have taken heaven and hell to build the incomparable abode of the Athenian Virgin Goddess. Had the Athenians suffered less, had they triumphed over lesser enemies, no Phidias could have sculptured the birth of Athena, and no Ictinus could have been found to indicate the noble lines of the Parthenon. The father of Phidias was Themistocles; or, rather, both were sons of that Athens that destroyed the Persian might at Marathon and Salamis, and that triumphed over brute Nature in the friezes and metopes of the Great Temple.

If this be, as it undoubtedly is, the case with art, how very much stronger become all these arguments when applied to religion! The Parthenon requires, as its indispensable antecedent, a long series of national tragedies and triumphs; and the sublime idea of ethical Monotheism should require as its antecedent nothing else than a few trading Babylonians? Even art smaller than that of the Greeks can not arise, and has never arisen, without an atmosphere of mental and social agitation, such as commonplace nations can never hope to enjoy; and the

rise of Monotheism in Israel was preceded by events no more exciting than the opening of a fair or the reading of a few clay-tablets? No sane person will believe that. No student of history will hesitate to say that great events must have had great causes. It has been reserved for the Higher Critics to imagine the rise of one of the greatest phenomena of history in the way in which Mark Twain relates the discovery of America to children. "Are you Mr. Columbus?" said the natives to the great Genoese on his landing on their island. "Yes," said Columbus; "and are you the Americans?" "Yes," said the natives; and then looking at one another, they exclaimed, "We are discovered!"

Did the discovery of America happen in this fashion? Were not Titanic struggles required for its consummation? When the secular attempts of the Turks had finally, in 1453, led to their conquest of Constantinople; when the Turks had made themselves masters of the Near East,—then, and only then, the Western Christian nations, and chiefly the great trading Republics in Italy, being thwarted in their Oriental trade by the Turks, were forced to look for a trade-route in the West, over the Atlantic, as for their sole means of economic salvation.

Every schoolboy knows that. Every schoolboy knows that America could not have been discovered but for secular and tremendous, or as it were, "geological" revolutions and crises in Christian Europe. No one ignores that the discovery of America by the Vikings, being neither preceded by nor meant to allay such crises, was speedily rendered null, and void, and fruitless. And the "discovery" of Monotheism should have required no crises, no "geological" upheavals, no stress and anguish, no national trials and triumphs at all?

The above and other passages in Amos and Hosea alone are therefore completely sufficient to establish the inevitable connection between Hebrew Monotheism and the Great National Crisis of the Israelites; that is, the Egyptian slavery and the Exodus, upon which both Prophets repeatedly insist. Nothing short of such a national crisis could have rendered the Israelites capable of appreciating and observing Monotheism. We said of Moses, that had he not done what he did, he could not have taught what he taught. We may now add with tenfold force, had the Israelites not suffered or triumphed as they did, they could not have observed Monotheism. The deed is the father of the idea. The Bible, in confirming this, the

most certain principle of ancient *classical* history, or the history of the "Semitic" and Hellenic border-nations, has, by this glorious trait alone, given the historian the grandest proof of its holy authenticity. No scribbling "interpolator" or "redactor" could have ever thought of this parental relation of Deed and Idea, of Exodus and Monotheism. A scribbler knows not the nature of deeds. The higher critical scribes of our times have not known it either. For them an idea is a child of the brain, of the proud Intellect. They ignore, that the aristocrats among ideas are all deed-born, because coming from the heart. They ignore that ideas such as Monotheism are the rainbow visible only after tempests, torrents of rain, and wild storms. They think that ideas are those puny things that arise when one learned infirmity embraces the other in the form of a quotation. They think that the British predilection for inductive and cautious thinking comes from a reading of Bacon's *Novum Organum*, Oxford edition in 8°. They think—it is impossible to say what they think.

For persons who have not yet lost their sense of reality, and who have in their own practical experience long found the true relation between national ideas and national deeds, the Bible is

the Book of all books, especially for its intense Reality. It breathes the rough, ill-scanned, and violent, yet bracing and soothing atmosphere of Reality on every one of its pages. It came from Reality; it has all its luster and life; it communicates it to every one. It has consoled so many hundreds of millions, because it was written by souls divinely consoled after the most tragic national destiny had crushed them; it elevates millions, because it was written by men who had been divinely elevated from the dust of national contrition and self-contempt to the heights of serene content; it has been believed by so many millions and millions of good and strong men and virtuous women, because it was born out of the strongest belief of Man in God, of Man in Man, and of Man in Woman. Without the reality of those tragic destinies, of those consolations, and of that great Belief, the Bible could have impressed people no more intensely than did the insipid yet highly rhetorical vaporings of the Babylonia priests. When a man suffers, he is full of the reality of his pain. Nothing short of a consoling power that has known similar, nay, greater pain, can console him. The abiding value of the Bible is rooted in the abiding value of Reality.

We remarked, at the beginning of the third

chapter, that the "Higher Critic" is incapable of feeling the force of the powerful arguments against his theory. It will now be seen, that his inability comes from his ignorance of and callousness to Reality. Whether he treats Greek, Roman, or Hebrew history, he is alike unable to seize those driving forces of Reality which have really made history. What he wants, what he is interested in, what he really means to do, is to handle words, and nothing but words. He is a word-monger. One of them, the famous Ranke, used to say that what we needed in history was to know "what, after all, had really been going on" ("*wie es denn eigentlich geschehen ist*"). As a matter of fact, Ranke and all his disciples only cared to know what had been *said* about what had been going on, by contemporaries. They are after documents, not after Causes; after words, not after psychological forces. They never dare to cross-examine, nor to Röntgenize the past by means of a knowledge of the human capital and its functions. They neglect the constant Causes, such as geo-politics; that is, they want to find the formula of the curves of history, by neglecting to determine the *abscissae*. They misunderstand the principal variable cause, Personality, and so they misconstrue the *ordinatas* of

history, too. To this point, as to one touching the immediate subject of the present work more directly, we must now turn our attention. The more particular and technical reason why "Higher Critics" attempt to destroy the authenticity of the Bible is their incapacity to grasp the meaning and power of Personality in History. This they will never do; and hence no arguments based on a right understanding of Personality can avail with them. "Higher Critics" must be handled by means of an instrument much rougher than is the theory of Personality in History. Nor is it very hard to foretell the nature of this instrument. It is, as in every case, the same old story. We are punished by the very things by which we sinned. The "Higher Critics" pride themselves on being honest people, who, at the risk of being persecuted—poor souls!—*will* call a spade, a spade. Now, this is precisely the instrument that will exterminate them. They call, they say, a spade, a spade. Have they not yet learned to dread what the Spade will call them? The spade, now so busy in Palestine, will undoubtedly, and in the near future, unearth a copy of Genesis in cuneiform script, dating from the thirteenth or twelfth century B. C. By this one find, all the theories of the "Higher Critics," propounded



in thousands of elaborate works, will vanish from literary existence as did the nightmare of witch-trials when the thunder of the French Revolution began to roar over the heads of the absolutist princes and their obsequious judges. A copy of Genesis or Exodus in cuneiform script is the lie direct to all the theories of the "Higher Critics" about the post-Mosaic, "Exilic," or post-Exile origin; *i. e.*, fabrication of the Pentateuch. The lie direct,—there can be no doubt about that, not even in the minds of the most benighted of "Higher Critics." Is it now sufficiently clear which name the honest Spade will give to the "Higher Critics" who so bravely pose as "honest brokers" of truth, as men who "call a spade, a spade?"

We said, that as geo-politics are the principal amongst the *constant* Causes of History, so Personality is amongst the variable ones. Personality has its history, and the various ages of history produce different types of Personality. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries A. D. produced the type of the "Kingmaker,"—of Warwick, Zápolya, the Vasas, the Guises, and, a little later in sluggish Austria, Wallenstein. The seventeenth century produced the type of great ministers,—Sully, Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, Colbert; and in Austria, always

behindhand, Kaunitz in the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century produced a blend of the "Kingmaker" and the great minister, in that Bismarck, Deák, Cavour, Lincoln "united," not dynasties, but their nations.

It is, however, in classical antiquity where personality, being of a type very much superior to all the modern types just enumerated, has played its greatest rôle. In modern times there is only one example of the type of Hebrew, Greek, or Roman political Personality: Napoleon. He is essentially antique. It was reserved for H. Taine to see in Napoleon a Renaissance type of Personality. In reality, the incomparable Corsican was of the stuff of which the great men of classical antiquity were made. For he, too, and he alone, was given rise to by a Titanic struggle such as the classical ancients had had in plenty, but we moderns only once, the French Revolution. In Palestine, in the Hellenic countries, in Roman Italy, there was more than one immense upheaval and strife essentially identical with the gigantic event called the French Revolution. Accordingly, in Palestine, in the Hellenic countries, in Roman Italy, there was more than one Napoleon. Personality, in those ancient countries, developed to a grandeur, to an importance, to a power of vast

influence over the destinies of nations, such as less agitated times can neither produce nor readily comprehend. Nobody, indeed, doubts that from 1800 to 1814 A. D. all Europe, both political and social, was dominated, made, and unmade by one great Personality, by Napoleon. This is exactly what happened repeatedly to the classical nations from 2000 B. C. to 200 A. D. Being agitated, as they were, by revolutions and wars involving the same structural and fundamental changes as were those of the French Revolution, they, too, had a series of political and spiritual Napoleons, whose power over their destinies can be denied only by him who will seriously undertake to prove that the history of Europe from 1800 to 1814 A. D. does *not* spell Napoleon.

This, the plainest teaching of ancient classical history, is, however, the very statement, the very truth that nearly all modern historians and theologians, particularly in Germany, deride, neglect, ignore. We said above, at the end of the second chapter, that all ancient classical history is cephalic. It comes from and is totally dominated by towering Personalities of various kinds, just as Europe was for a time dominated, vitalized, and revolutionized by Napoleon. We now see the psychological reason why classical

nations were necessarily bound to be more cephalic than are modern nations. Theirs was the greater, the more intense struggle. They had many a "French Revolution." We essayed to show that, of all classical nations, the border-nations in Western Asia had, by their geo-political situation in historic space, the greatest number of "French Revolutions," and hence the most intense need of, and ability to produce, those great Personalities. To deny these Personalities, is to deny the existence both of those border-nations and of the geographical configuration of Western Asia. It is no exaggeration to say that he who denies the historic existence of Moses, denies the Mediterranean, the Nile, and the Euphrates. He who does not believe nor see, that all classical history, including, in the first place, that of the ancient Hebrews, is and necessarily was cephalic, reads the whole of classical history through convex glasses. What is upright, he perceives as horizontal; what is flat, he believes to be of three dimensions. He misunderstands the wars of the ancients, as well as their art; their religion, as well as their ethics; their amusements, as well as their legislation. He perverts all history. He distorts it. No wonder, one of those ill-starred historians of antiquity, for whom Moses

and the Exodus are in the "highest degree" problematic; for whom Lycurgus never existed, and Socrates' *demon*, a farce,—no wonder, we say, that Professor Eduard Meyer, of Berlin, has so completely lost all sense of proportion that he declares Frederick William I of Prussia, the grotesque and stupid father of Frederick the Great, to be "probably the most important figure of modern times!" Moses, it will be seen, is according to this voluminous historian, and "Higher Critic," a most problematic thing; and Frederick William I of Prussia is more important than his son, than Chatham, Mirabeau, Napoleon, or Bismarck. Really, the German professors of history are providentially reserved for the maintenance of hilarity in Olympus and on earth.

It may now be seen why we said that one might perhaps deny the historical existence of the ancient Hebrews, although *we* do not see at all how that could be done; but once the existence of that nation is admitted, to deny Moses, is to deny "noon at twelve o'clock," as the French say; is to deny the existence of Napoleon, after having admitted the existence of the French Revolution. Moses is psychologically as integral a part of the history of the Israelites as the three angles of a triangle are logically a

part of that geometric figure. In saying this, we have not said enough. What we just now said about Moses applies to all the Personalities of Hebrew history from about 2000 B. C. to 100 A. D. They do indeed form a chain, a living chain of organs, as it were, linked together by the same Great Life, the same Great Destiny. From Abraham to Jesus there is no break, no interruption. The Patriarchs, the Judges, the Kings, the Prophets, the Savior, the Apostles,—they are all and one the ever-rising Force that necessarily always incarnates itself in a great and eventually in a transcendental Personality. Where struggles so intense and aspirations so vast are the rule, there Personality of an ever greater type can not be missing. The "Higher Critics," by misconstruing Personality, misconstrue all those struggles, all those aspirations. He who misinterprets Abraham, misreports and misunderstands Jesus of Nazareth; as, on a minor scale, he who misconstrues Lycurgus, misreports and misunderstands Leonidas, Lysander, Agesilaos, and Cleomenes III; and he who disbelieves in Romulus, misconstrues the Scipios and the Marcelli. Just as all Athenian history gravitated towards its culminating Personality, Pericles; just as all Carthaginian history gravitated up to Hannibal,

and all Roman history to Julius Cæsar: even so, on a plane even more elevated, and more significant, all Hebrew history necessarily culminated, from Personality to Personality, in Jesus. To deny Abraham, is to deny Jesus; is to deny the plainest facts of that pre-eminently cephalic history that is the foundation and life-giving Essence of Humanity. Higher Criticism stands condemned by history fully as much as by true religion. It is neither true, nor helpful. It is the distortion of historic truth, as well as the desecration of true religion.



















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